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Abstract
This Comment addresses the present gap in insanity-defense laws
created by the defense’s abolition and offers an Eighth Amendment
based remedy. Part I reviews the history and evolution of the insanity
defense in Anglo-American law. It then describes how four states
have statutorily abolished the defense. It concludes with a discussion
of Clark v. Arizona, the Court’s most recent decision on the
constitutionality of the insanity defense. Part II turns to the Eighth
Amendment, examining its historical understanding and the
contemporary evolving-standards-of-decency analysis, through which
the Court assesses the constitutionality of modern-day punishments.
Part II concludes with a discussion of Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas, two non-death-penalty
Eighth Amendment decisions
that illustrate contrasting approaches to Eighth Amendment
interpretation.
Part III examines the Court’s recent Eighth
Amendment death-penalty jurisprudence, focusing on two decisions
involving mentally deficient offenders, Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v.
Virginia, where the Court expanded the Eighth Amendment to
protect two groups—minors and the mentally retarded—against the
imposition of capital punishment. Part IV argues that these recent
precedents are sufficiently analogous, legally and factually, to the
insane-offender context; therefore, the Court should apply the rules
and reasoning of these decisions to the issue of punishing the insane.
Part V then applies the Roper and Atkins Eighth Amendment analyses
to the issue of criminal punishment for otherwise insane offenders,
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the end result of abolishing the insanity defense. Part V concludes
that under these new precedents, abolition of the insanity defense
results in unconstitutionally excessive punishments, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Accordingly, this
Comment concludes that the safeguard against this constitutional
violation—the affirmative insanity defense—merits constitutional
protection.
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“[T]here could be no greater cruelty than trying, convicting, and 
punishing a person wholly unable to understand the nature and 
consequence of his act . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of June 20, 2001, Andrea Yates drew a bath in the 
guest bathroom and one by one held her five young children under 
water until each drowned.2  Yates did not dispute that she killed her 
children.3  Nevertheless, a Texas jury acquitted her of all criminal 
charges.4  This is because Yates suffered from such severe mental 
disease5 that criminal liability could not attach to her actions.  This 
                                                          
 1. Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 585 (Miss. 1931) (Ethridge, J., concurring). 
 2. See, e.g., Insanity Defense Works for Yates, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2006, 
at 4 (discussing the underlying facts of the Andrea Yates trial); Woman Not Guilty in 
Retrial in the Deaths of Her 5 Children, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter 
Woman Not Guilty] (reporting the Andrea Yates trial verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity and discussing the details of her children’s deaths); Yates Found Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A1 (reporting on the Andrea Yates 
trial). 
 3. See, e.g., Susan Reimer, A Fresh Look Into the Eyes of Killer Mom, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2004, at E1 (detailing Andrea Yates’ killing of her five children). 
 4. See, e.g., Woman Not Guilty, supra note 2 (reporting the Andrea Yates trial 
verdict). 
 5. Yates suffered from severe postpartum psychosis and, in a delusional state, 
believed that she was possessed by Satan and killed her children in order to save 
them from hell.  Id. 
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case illustrates the centuries-old6 Anglo-American criminal defense of 
insanity. 
At first blush the acquittal of a confessed killer may seem wrong, a 
grave injustice even.  The insanity defense, however, serves a purpose 
higher than the punishment of those committing otherwise criminal 
acts:  it represents society’s moral and social judgment that 
individuals unable to understand or control their conduct deserve 
treatment, not punishment.7  Thus, if such a person poses a 
continuing danger, he or she may be confined in a non-punitive 
setting for psychiatric treatment,8 but should not be imprisoned.  
Accordingly, the acquittal of Yates, a victim of severe mental disease, 
represents the insanity defense’s proper function:  separating 
society’s mentally ill citizens for treatment, rather than punishment. 
A relatively recent trend, however, has been the abolition of the 
affirmative insanity defense.  Since 1979, four states—Montana, 
Idaho, Utah, and Kansas—have eliminated the defense.9  This new 
policy, the mens rea approach,10 markedly departs from fundamental 
Anglo-American criminal-law principles11 and is anathema to our 
                                                          
 6. See DONALD H.J. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE:  PHILOSOPHICAL, 
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 22 (1983) (explaining that insanity was 
recognized as a defense for criminal conduct in England as early as 1268). 
 7. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that 
the insanity defense represents “the law’s conscientious efforts to place in a separate 
category, people who cannot be justly held ‘responsible’ for their acts”); MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 165 (1985) (characterizing the purpose of the insanity 
defense as “etch[ing] a decent working line between the areas assigned to the 
authorities responsible for public health and those responsible for the correction of 
offenders”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining the 
function of the insanity defense as separating from the criminal-justice system those 
who should only be subjected to medical-custodial measures, as their mental state 
precludes the kind of personal culpability necessary for punitive measures). 
 8. After a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendants are typically 
committed to mental institutions for psychiatric treatment.  LAFAVE, supra note 7, 
§ 8.4.  In some jurisdictions commitment to a psychiatric institution is mandatory 
after an insanity acquittal.  See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 n.20 
(1983) (upholding constitutionality of mandatory commitment for insanity 
acquittees).  In other jurisdictions commitment is ordered only if it is found that the 
defendant’s insanity continues or that the defendant is dangerous.  See SANFORD H. 
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 882-84 (7th ed. 
2001) (surveying various approaches taken by the states towards the post-trial 
disposition of insanity acquittees). 
 9. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2721-22 (2006). 
 10. See discussion infra Part I.B.1 (defining the mens rea approach). 
 11. See United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1012 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that, while the particular insanity standard has differed throughout American legal 
history, our common law has always rejected “assign[ing] criminal responsibility to 
an actor who was unable, at the time he or she committed the crime, to know either 
what was being done or that it was wrong”); United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 
900 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing Congress’ consideration and rejection of a proposal to 
abolish the insanity defense and quoting a House Report that found “[abolition] 
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common-law tradition of treating, rather than punishing, the 
insane.12  The mens rea model removes the legal mechanism society 
has traditionally used to distinguish blameworthy from non-
blameworthy offenders, and allows criminal punishment, including 
the death penalty,13 for morally blameless insane offenders.14  
Consequently, the abolition of the insanity defense represents a 
fundamental injustice against society’s mentally ill,15 and it is time for 
the Supreme Court to rectify this wrong. 
The Supreme Court has only addressed the constitutional 
implications of the insanity defense from a due process perspective.16  
However, the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in 
the analogous area of capital punishment for mentally deficient 
offenders17 provides compelling rules and reasoning against certain 
punishments for the mentally deficient, which the Court may 
logically apply to the insane-offender context.  Applying the Eighth 
                                                          
would alter that fundamental basis of Anglo-American criminal law:  the existence of 
moral culpability as a prerequisite for punishment”). 
 12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the insanity defense’s 
traditional function of separating society’s inculpable for treatment rather than 
punitive correction). 
 13. Otherwise insane offenders do commit capital crimes, and without an 
affirmative insanity defense such offenders face capital punishment.  See, e.g., Woman 
Not Guilty, supra note 2 (reporting that a Texas jury found Andrea Yates not guilty by 
reason of insanity of drowning her five children); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 19.03(a)(7)-(8) (Vernon 2006) (providing that the murder of more than one 
person during the same offense or the murder a person under six years of age is a 
capital crime in Texas). 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the mens rea approach adopted by 
Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas and illustrating how this policy leads to the 
punishment of legally blameless insane defendants). 
 15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 166 (1985) (concluding that those who 
satisfy an insanity standard are legally irresponsible, and the imposition of criminal 
punishment is therefore “futile and unjust”). 
 16. The Eighth Amendment implications of abolishing the insanity defense have 
been addressed at the state level, however.  See State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 889 
(Mont. 1993) (holding that sentencing the defendant, a paranoid schizophrenic, to 
prison after a trial in which he was not afforded an affirmative insanity defense 
violated the Eighth Amendment); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984) 
(holding that Montana’s abolition of the insanity defense did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments). The Supreme 
Court has addressed the Eighth Amendment rights of the insane in the context of 
executing insane inmates.  See Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing insane prisoners).  Wainright 
addressed the Eighth Amendment implications of executing a prisoner who became 
insane while in prison, after his conviction.  Legal insanity was not a factor during the 
commission of the criminal offense.  Thus, Wainright did not reach the 
constitutionality of the insanity defense. 
 17. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-75 (2005) (holding that the juvenile 
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that 
capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments). 
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Amendment analysis employed in this analogous area of 
jurisprudence, determining whether there is a national consensus 
against punishing the insane and supplementing this consensus with 
the Court’s independent judgment, reveals that punishing the insane 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive 
punishments.  There is currently an overwhelming national 
consensus against punishing insane offenders,18 a consensus justified 
by the independent determination that punishing persons unable to 
control their thoughts or actions neither contributes to generally 
accepted penal goals,19 nor is proportional to the insane offender’s 
personal culpability.20  Consequently, criminal punishment for insane 
offenders is categorically “excessive”21 and constitutes punishment 
that the Court has traditionally deemed cruel and unusual in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.22  Thus, although currently untested, the Eighth 
Amendment may offer an effective approach towards granting 
federal constitutional protection to the insanity defense, thereby 
safeguarding mentally ill citizens against undeserved criminal 
punishment. 
This Comment addresses the present gap in insanity-defense laws 
created by the defense’s abolition and offers an Eighth Amendment 
based remedy.  Part I reviews the history and evolution of the insanity 
defense in Anglo-American law.  It then describes how four states 
have statutorily abolished the defense.  It concludes with a discussion 
of Clark v. Arizona,23 the Court’s most recent decision on the 
constitutionality of the insanity defense.  Part II turns to the Eighth 
Amendment, examining its historical understanding and the 
contemporary evolving-standards-of-decency analysis, through which 
the Court assesses the constitutionality of modern-day punishments.  
Part II concludes with a discussion of Robinson v. California24 and 
                                                          
 18. See discussion infra Part V.A (surveying state policy regarding the insanity 
defense and arguing that the forty-six states that provide the defense constitute a 
national consensus under the Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent). 
 19. See discussion infra Part V.B.1 (arguing that criminal punishment for insane 
offenders fails to effectively advance the penological goals of retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or incapacitation). 
 20. See discussion infra Part V.C.1 (explaining the insane offender’s absence of 
culpability, on account of his or her severe mental disease, and arguing that any 
punishment is categorically disproportionate). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.A (defining unconstitutionally “excessive” 
punishment as that which fails to contribute to acceptable penal goals or is grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime). 
 22. See discussion infra Parts II-III (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on unconstitutionally excessive punishments). 
 23. 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006). 
 24. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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Powell v. Texas,25 two non-death-penalty Eighth Amendment decisions 
that illustrate contrasting approaches to Eighth Amendment 
interpretation.  Part III examines the Court’s recent Eighth 
Amendment death-penalty jurisprudence, focusing on two decisions 
involving mentally deficient offenders, Roper v. Simmons26 and Atkins v. 
Virginia,27 where the Court expanded the Eighth Amendment to 
protect two groups—minors and the mentally retarded—against the 
imposition of capital punishment.28  Part IV argues that these recent 
precedents are sufficiently analogous, legally and factually, to the 
insane-offender context; therefore, the Court should apply the rules 
and reasoning of these decisions to the issue of punishing the insane.  
Part V then applies the Roper and Atkins Eighth Amendment analyses 
to the issue of criminal punishment for otherwise insane offenders, 
the end result of abolishing the insanity defense.  Part V concludes 
that under these new precedents, abolition of the insanity defense 
results in unconstitutionally excessive punishments, in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.  Accordingly, this 
Comment concludes that the safeguard against this constitutional 
violation—the affirmative insanity defense—merits constitutional 
protection. 
I. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ABOLITION 
Excusing the mentally disordered from responsibility for their 
actions has ancient roots.29  The criminal insanity defense, in 
particular, has enjoyed a rich tradition in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.30  Recently, however, states have experimented with 
                                                          
 25. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 26. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 27. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 28. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
capital punishment for offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their 
offenses were committed); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded 
offenders). 
 29. Ancient Hebrew law allowed for the exculpation of the mentally deficient.  
See HERMANN, supra note 6, at 18-19 (quoting the Talmud’s stipulation that mentally 
deficient actors were not to be punished for offensive actions “because with them 
only the act is of consequence while the intention is of no consequence”) (internal 
citation omitted).  Similarly, early Roman legal sources from the fourth-century B.C. 
refer to the incapacity of the insane.  See id. at 20 (discussing the Twelve Tables, the 
Romans’ earliest legal source, which recognized the mental inabilities of the insane).  
Sixth-century A.D. codifications of Roman law include explicit references to the 
exculpatory effect of insanity.  See id. (detailing Justinian’s sixth-century codification 
of Roman law, which recognized insanity’s exculpatory significance for contractual 
and delictual obligations). 
 30. See id. at 22 (noting insanity’s recognition as an excuse for criminal conduct 
in thirteenth-century England); see also ALEC BUCHANAN, PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF 
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the misguided policy of abolishing the insanity defense,31 a policy that 
leads to criminal punishment32 for undeserving defendants.33  These 
states afford mentally diseased offenders a far narrower mechanism 
for the reduction of criminal responsibility.34 
A. The Insanity Defense Generally 
The insanity defense is an affirmative defense, in that the 
defendant, who usually carries the subsequent burden of persuasion 
at trial, must raise it.35  It is also considered a complete defense, in 
that it results in a total acquittal, even if the government has proved 
all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.36 
American jurisprudence consists of multiple standards for the 
insanity defense, each with important differences.37  All variants, 
however, trace their origin to three traditional insanity standards:  the 
M’Naghten standard,38 the irresistible-impulse test,39 and the product-
                                                          
JUSTIFICATION, EXCUSE AND MITIGATION:  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MENTAL ABNORMALITY 
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 84 (2000) (quoting the writings of eighth-century 
Archbishop of York, Egbert:  “[i]f a man fall out of his senses or wits, and it come to 
pass that he kill someone, let his kinsmen pay for the victim, and preserve the slayer 
against all else of that kind”). 
 31. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2721-22 (2006) (observing that four 
states—Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah—have eliminated the affirmative insanity 
defense since 1979). 
 32. See discussion infra Part I.B.2 (explaining how the mens rea approach 
adopted by Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas results in criminal punishment for 
mentally diseased offenders whose conduct would not be criminal in states 
employing an affirmative insanity defense). 
 33. See discussion infra Part V.B.2 (arguing that the lack of free will among insane 
offenders renders that entire class categorically inculpable). 
 34. See discussion infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the mens rea model and explaining 
its limited ability to reduce criminal responsibility for mentally diseased offenders). 
 35. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 47 (2006). 
 36. The insanity defense falls under the category of excuse defenses.  Paul H. 
Robinson, A Theory of Justification:  Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 
23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 275 (1975).  An excuse defense justifies complete acquittal 
based on the defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility resulting from some 
personal characteristic, such as mental disability.  LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 9.1(a)(4).  
Legally, the action is still considered wrongful, but criminal liability does not attach to 
the actor on account of the personal disability that renders him blameless.  Robinson, 
supra, at 275.  In the insanity-defense context, the disability justifying acquittal is the 
defendant’s mental disease, which precludes control over his actions thereby 
rendering him unaccountable for his otherwise criminal conduct. 
 37. See Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2720 (canvassing American insanity defenses and 
categorizing the multiplicity of tests as fitting into one of four groups:  cognitive 
incapacity, moral incapacity, volitional incapacity, the product-of-mental-illness tests, 
or a combination thereof). 
 38. The M’Naghten standard, commonly referred to as the “right-wrong” test, 
holds that there is no criminal responsibility if, at the time of the crime, the accused 
“was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did 
not know he was doing what was wrong.”  Harlow M. Huckabee, Mental Disability:  
Evidence on Mens Rea Versus the Insanity Defenses, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 442 (1993) 
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of-mental-illness test.40  The various approaches currently employed 
by the states41 incorporate the basic elements of these foundational 
standards.42 
B. The Abolition of the Insanity Defense 
Despite the historic use of the insanity defense in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence and its wide acceptance among American states, many 
scholars and lawmakers strongly criticize the defense and advocate its 
abolition.43  Currently, Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas44 have 
                                                          
(quoting M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.)); see also LAFAVE, supra 
note 7, § 7.2 (discussing the M’Naghten insanity defense, including its origin in the 
1843 English trial of Daniel M’Naghten, contemporary interpretations of the 
M’Naghten test’s elements, and modern criticisms of the M’Naghten standard).  See 
generally United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615-21 (2d Cir. 1966) (surveying the 
history and development of the M’Naghten standard, including contemporary 
criticisms).  M’Naghten is the standard presently used in England and Ireland, and 
historically has comprised the basis of the insanity defense in almost every American 
state at some point.  FAYE BOLAND, ANGLO-AMERICAN INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM:  THE 
WAR BETWEEN LAW AND MEDICINE 1 (1999).  Accordingly, the M’Naghten rule is 
arguably the most influential development in Anglo-American insanity 
jurisprudence.  See id. (reviewing the history and evolution of the M’Naghten rule and 
arguing that it is the historical reference point for the Anglo-American insanity 
defense).  The two prongs of the M’Naghten rule form the basis of the modern 
cognitive and moral incapacity standards.  Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2720. 
 39. The irresistible-impulse test, typically used as a supplement to the M’Naghten 
standard, compels the court to acquit by reason of insanity if the accused had a 
mental disease or defect that kept him from controlling the conduct involved in the 
crime, despite the fact that he may have understood the wrongfulness of his actions 
under M’Naghten.  See Huckabee, supra note 38, at 442-43 (defining the irresistible-
impulse test).  Modern volitional incapacity standards emanate from the irresistible-
impulse test.  See Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2720 (noting this standard’s two-hundred-year 
history and explaining its modern-day influence). 
 40. The product test broadly states that the defendant should be acquitted if his 
criminal act was the product of any mental disease.  Durham v. United States, 214 
F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1954).  See generally Freeman, 357 F.2d at 621-22 (surveying 
the development of the product test, and reviewing its criticisms). Currently, the 
product insanity defense is only employed in the state of New Hampshire.  Clark, 126 
S. Ct. at 2721; see also State v. Plante, 594 A.2d 1279, 1283 (N.H. 1991) (citing State v. 
Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871)) (stating New Hampshire’s product test for insanity). 
 41. See infra note 190 and accompanying text (listing the types of insanity 
defenses currently used by the forty-six states that provide it, the federal jurisdiction, 
and the District of Columbia).  Although the aforementioned standards represent 
the historical basis for present-day insanity law, a fourth standard was promulgated by 
the American Legal Institute (“ALI”) in 1962, which has proved influential for the 
modern insanity-defense law.  The ALI’s test for insanity states, “[a] person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).  This standard, an amalgam of a volitional 
and moral incapacity test, is the basis for the insanity defense in fourteen 
jurisdictions.  Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2721. 
 42. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2720-21. 
 43. See LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.1(d) (listing popular criticisms of the insanity 
defense, such as that its key terms are often so vague that the defense invites 
speculations rather than factual determinations; there is no reliable medical basis for 
LEBLANC.OFFTOPRINTER 6/2/2007  3:54:36 PM 
2007] CRUELTY TO THE MENTALLY ILL 1289 
adopted this policy, which employs the alternative mens rea 
approach.45 
1. The mens rea approach 
The mens rea approach involves the use of mental-disability 
evidence to negate the mens rea element46 of the offense charged.47  
It allows the defendant to use evidence of mental disease to rebut or 
disprove the prosecution’s case by establishing that the defendant, by 
virtue of his disease, was incapable of forming the mental state 
required for the crime charged.48 
                                                          
distinguishing between the man who is personally blameworthy for his mental 
makeup and the man who is not; the determination of how best to deal with mentally 
disordered persons who commit crimes is better dealt with after traditional 
conviction; it may be therapeutically beneficial to treat societal deviants as culpable 
for their actions rather than as involuntary victims of sickness; and that the insanity 
defense is an unfair “rich-man’s defense” in that only the wealthy can afford the 
expert resources necessary for a successful defense); see also BOLAND, supra note 38, at 
73, 75, 77 (citing criticisms of the insanity defense, such as that the defense is often 
expressed with such vagueness as to give no basis for evaluating the multitude of 
varying standards, that the exculpation for insanity is simply unjustifiable, and that 
there is public support for the defense’s elimination since many Americans view a 
correlation between rising crime rates and the proliferation of insanity acquittals).  
But see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, MYTHS & REALITIES:  A REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 14, 22-23 (1983) (criticizing 
the proposition that the insanity defense is a “rich-man’s defense” as unfounded and 
finding that the public’s support for abolition of the defense is based on the 
misguided “myth” that the defense is overused). 
 44. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102, 46-14-311 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003). 
 45. These states were not the first to experiment with abolishing the insanity 
defense.  Mississippi, Louisiana, and Washington abolished their insanity defenses in 
the early twentieth century.  Ultimately, however, their respective state supreme 
courts held these policies unconstitutional.  See Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 585 
(Miss. 1931) (holding that a statute that abolished the insanity defense in homicide 
cases violated the due-process clause of the Mississippi Constitution); State v. Lange, 
123 So. 639, 641 (La. 1929) (holding that a statute which prevented defendants from 
asserting an insanity defense violated the Louisiana Constitution); State v. 
Strasbourg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1910) (holding that a statute that eliminated 
the criminal insanity defense contravened the Washington Constitution’s due-
process clause); see also Rita Buitendorp, Note, A Statutory Lesson from “Big Sky Country” 
on Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 965, 965 n.4 (1996) (delineating 
the historical precedents to Montana’s abolition of its insanity defense). 
 46. See Huckabee, supra note 38, at 445 (defining mens rea as a legal concept 
meaning a guilty mind, wrongful purpose or criminal intent, or the requisite mental 
state of the offense charged). 
 47. Id. at 442. 
 48. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (“Evidence that the defendant suffered 
from a mental disease or defect or developmental disability is admissible to prove 
that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the 
offense.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (“[I]t is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the 
mental state required as an element of the offense charged.  Mental illness is not 
otherwise a defense.”). 
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Whereas an affirmative insanity defense is a separate and 
independent defense, serving to exculpate the offender even if all 
elements of the prosecution’s case are proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the mens rea approach is not independent of the 
prosecution’s case.  The mens rea approach is concerned with 
disproving an element of the prosecution’s case, thereby defending 
the accused against the charges.  If the prosecution proves all 
elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant 
is convicted, irrespective of whether his disease was sufficiently severe 
to satisfy a traditional insanity test. 
2. Abolition in practice 
In 1979, Montana became the first state to successfully abolish its 
affirmative insanity defense, adopting a mens rea approach instead.49  
In State v. Cowan,50 the Montana Supreme Court upheld the state’s 
mens rea approach against due process51 and Eighth Amendment52 
challenges.  The Supreme Court denied review,53 thus allowing 
Montana’s new approach to stand. 
In the early 1980s, Idaho and Utah followed Montana’s lead.  In 
1982, the Idaho Legislature repealed that state’s affirmative insanity 
defense, replacing it with a mens rea approach.54  In State v. Searcy,55 
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the state’s mens rea approach 
                                                          
 49. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (“Evidence that the defendant suffered 
from a mental disease or defect or developmental disability is admissible to prove 
that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the 
offense.”); Buitendorp, supra note 45, at 977 n.76 (discussing the anti-crime politics 
that motivated Montana legislators to experiment with abolishing the insanity 
defense).  Prior to abolition, Montana used a variant of the American Legal 
Institute’s Model Penal Code insanity test.  Buitendorp, supra note 45, at 979. 
 50. 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993). 
 51. See id. at 888 (asserting that the Montana Supreme Court had previously 
“affirmed the constitutionality of the abolition of the insanity defense” against due-
process challenges and reaffirming that Montana’s mens rea approach does not 
“establish a conclusive or unrebuttable presumption of criminal intent,” and 
therefore does not violate due process). 
 52. See id. at 889 (holding that sentencing the defendant to prison does not 
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though he suffered from 
mental disease). 
 53. Cowan v. Montana, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994). 
 54. See Brian Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity Defense:  What Are We Trying to 
Prove?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 151, 156 (1994) (exploring the legal history behind Idaho’s 
abolition of the insanity defense); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207(1)-(3) (2004) 
(“Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct. . . .  
Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence on the issue 
of any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the rules of 
evidence.”).  Before its abolition, Idaho’s insanity defense was a variant of the ALI’s 
insanity test.  Elkins, supra, at 156. 
 55. 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990). 
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against a due process challenge.56  Utah followed suit in 1983 when its 
legislature abolished the state’s traditional insanity defense and 
adopted a mens rea model.57  In State v. Herrera,58 the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the constitutionality of Utah’s mens rea statute.59 
In 1995, Kansas became the latest state to abolish the affirmative 
insanity defense and employ a mens rea approach.60  In State v. 
Bethel,61 the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of 
Kansas’ mens rea statute against due process and Eighth Amendment 
challenges.62  In its opinion, the Bethel court noted the persuasiveness 
of Idaho,63 Montana,64 and Utah’s65 high court decisions on the 
constitutionality of the mens rea approach.66 
The statutory changes adopted by Montana, Idaho, Utah, and 
Kansas may not appear important, as the new statutory language 
seems somewhat similar to traditional insanity defenses.  These 
reforms, however, can dramatically affect the outcome of criminal 
cases dealing with mentally disordered offenders.  The following 
                                                          
 56. See id. at 919 (holding that the due-process clauses of the Federal and Idaho 
Constitutions do not guarantee a criminal insanity defense). 
 57. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah 1995) (discussing the political 
and legislative history of Utah’s 1983 abolition of its traditional insanity defense); see 
also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2003) (“[I]t is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the 
mental state required as an element of the offense charged.  Mental illness is not 
otherwise a defense.”).  Before the 1983 repeal, Utah used a variation of the 
M’Naghten rule.  See Herrera, 895 P.2d at 361-62 (describing Utah’s pre-1983 law as 
allowing the defendant to invoke the insanity defense on the ground that he or she 
committed the act but did not understand the wrongfulness of the conduct). 
 58. 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). 
 59. See Catherine E. Lilly, Comment, State v. Herrera:  The Utah Supreme Court 
Rules in Favor of Utah’s Controversial Insanity Defense Statute, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 221, 224 
(1996) (explaining that Herrera affirmed the constitutionality of Utah’s mens rea 
statute against challenges based on due process, burden of proof, equal protection, 
the right against self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual punishment). 
 60. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995) (“It is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the 
mental state required as an element of the offense charged.  Mental disease or defect 
is not otherwise a defense.”); see also Marc Rosen, Comment, Insanity Denied:  Abolition 
of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 253 (1999) (discussing 
the Kansas Legislature’s 1995 repeal of the affirmative insanity defense and arguing 
that the new legislation was passed to placate public concerns over the impropriety of 
the traditional defense’s use).  Prior to the abolition of its insanity defense, Kansas 
adhered to the M’Naghten rule.  Jenny Williams, Comment, Reduction in the Protection 
for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants:  Kansas Upholds the Replacement of the M’Naughten 
Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity Defense, 44 
WASHBURN L.J. 213, 213 (2004). 
 61. 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003). 
 62. Id. at 841-42, 854. 
 63. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990). 
 64. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984). 
 65. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). 
 66. See id. at 846-51 (emphasizing the cogency of the Searcy, Korell, and Herrera 
decisions’ constitutional analyses). 
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insanity cases illustrate this point.  In one case, the defendant stabbed 
his daughter over one-hundred-and-fifty times because he believed 
she was possessed by the devil.67  In a second case, the defendant 
extracted all of her daughter’s teeth because she believed Satan was 
inside of them.68  In a third case, the defendant threw his baby out of 
a window because he believed assailants, who did not exist, were 
pursuing him.69  In a fourth case, the defendant, suffering from 
severe delusions, castrated his young son.70  In a final case, the 
defendant, suffering from delusions that his parents would soon be 
tortured, killed them to save them from a painful death.71 
These defendants all suffered from severe mental disorders and all 
satisfied the applicable insanity defense statutes and were, therefore, 
not held criminally responsible.72  If tried in jurisdictions that had 
adopted the mens rea approach, however, all would have been guilty 
of crimes because evidence of the defendants’ delusions, while 
admissible, would not negate the requisite mens rea of the offenses 
committed.73  The defendant in case five, for example, knowingly and 
purposefully caused the deaths of his parents.74  Under the mens rea 
approach his delusions regarding their impending torture would not 
negate his knowing and purposeful acts, and he would therefore be 
guilty of murder, as his mental state would satisfy the mens rea 
element of that crime.75  The same would hold true for the other 
defendants had they been tried in mens rea jurisdictions, since they 
all intended their particular actions and evidence of their mental 
diseases would have been irrelevant for purposes of criminal 
                                                          
 67. R.D. Mackay, Fact and Fiction About the Insanity Defense, 1990 CRIM. L. REV. 247, 
250 (1990), analyzed in Rosen, supra note 60, at 261-62. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Under the mens rea approach these defendants would have to disprove the 
prosecution’s case by establishing that, by virtue of their delusions, they were 
incapable of forming the intent to commit their crimes.  See discussion infra Part 
I.B.1 (defining the mens rea approach).  Although these defendants’ delusions 
caused them to commit crimes for reasons not grounded in reality, the delusions did 
not inhibit these defendants’ intent to act as they did.  Rosen, supra note 60, at 262.  
See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 132 (2006) (summarizing authorities, which hold 
that insanity does not preclude a criminal mens rea or a general intent to commit 
the criminal act).  Hence, these defendants could not satisfy the mens rea test and all 
would be found guilty. 
 74. Rosen, supra note 60, at 262. 
 75. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining 
murder as purposely or knowingly causing the death of another human being); see 
also United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[A] man who 
commits murder because he feels compelled by demons still possesses the mens rea 
required for murder.”). 
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responsibility.76  In fact, severe mental disease will very rarely wholly 
preclude the requisite mens rea, as such illnesses can delude reality 
and inhibit moral understanding, but rarely will preclude the 
formation of intent for one’s actions.77  Hence, the insanity defense 
reforms adopted by Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas unfairly 
subject an entire class of criminal defendants, wholly unable to 
control their thoughts or actions, to punishments that would not 
attach to conduct committed in affirmative-insanity-defense 
jurisdictions. 
C. Clark v. Arizona:  The Court Addresses a Narrowing                             
of the Insanity Defense 
On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court decided Clark v. Arizona,78 
the Court’s most recent decision addressing the constitutionality of 
the insanity defense.  Although Clark did not specifically address the 
constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defense, the case 
addressed the similar issue of a state’s authority to substantially limit 
the defense, and is therefore instructive for the issue of abolition. 
Petitioner Clark, a paranoid schizophrenic, was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after he failed to 
                                                          
 76. Another helpful way to illustrate the substantive differences between the 
affirmative insanity defense and the mens rea model is through the often-cited 
“lemon-squeezer” example, succinctly stated in State v. Herrera, the decision 
upholding the constitutionality of Utah’s mens rea approach: 
If A kills B, thinking that he is merely squeezing a grapefruit, A does not 
have the requisite mens rea for murder and would be acquitted under both 
the prior and new law. . . .  However, if A kills B, thinking that B is an enemy 
soldier and that the killing is justified as self-defense, then A has the requisite 
mens rea for murder and could be convicted under the new law but not 
under the prior law, because he knowingly and intentionally took another’s 
life.  Under the amended provision, it does not matter whether A 
understood that the act was wrong. 
895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995).  Thus, under the mens rea model, one laboring 
under severe delusions, detached from reality and wholly unable to comprehend the 
wrongness of his actions, is criminally condemned.  Such a policy is a dramatic 
departure from centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence, which historically has 
deemed such actor’s morally blameless and undeserving of punishment.  See supra 
note 38 (discussing the M’Naghten standard for insanity, the oldest and most 
influential insanity test, which protects from punishment those persons unable to 
understand the wrongfulness of their actions); supra note 30 and accompanying text 
(noting the insanity defense’s rich common law tradition, a history dating to at least 
thirteenth-century England); see also United States v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 570 (1953)  
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Ever since our ancestral common law emerged out of 
the darkness of its early barbaric days, it has been a postulate of Western civilization 
that the taking of life by the hand of an insane person is not murder.”). 
 77. See Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900 (“Only in the rare case, however, will even a legally 
insane defendant actually lack the requisite mens rea purely because of mental 
defect . . . . Mental illness rarely, if ever, renders a person incapable of understanding 
what he or she is doing.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 78. 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006). 
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satisfy Arizona’s narrowed M’Naghten insanity standard.79  Clark 
challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s insanity defense statute 
on due process grounds,80 arguing that the two-pronged M’Naghten 
rule represents the minimum insanity defense a state must provide 
criminal defendants.81 
The Court rejected Clark’s argument,82 reasoning that there is no 
historical basis for recognizing the M’Naghten formula as a 
fundamental principle that limits the traditional rights of a state to 
define the crimes and defenses within its jurisdiction.83  Thus, the 
Court held that a narrow version of the M’Naghten rule comports with 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee.84  Further, the 
Court reaffirmed the principle that the type of insanity defense, 
including the allocation of the burden of persuasion,85 is entirely 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 2717-18.  In reaction to John Hinckley’s successful insanity defense in 
1981, Arizona implemented several reforms to its insanity-defense statute.  John 
Gibeaut, A Matter Over Mind, 92 A.B.A. J. 32, 33 (2006).  The Arizona legislature 
dropped the cognitive incapacity part of the M’Naghten rule (knowing the nature and 
quality of the act) and retained only the moral incapacity prong (knowing the 
wrongfulness of the act).  Id.  Additionally, Arizona shifted the burden of proof for 
establishing insanity from the prosecutor to the defendant and raised the standard of 
proof for defendants from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing 
evidence.  Id.  Consequently, under current Arizona law a defendant will not receive 
an insanity acquittal unless he demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
“at the time of the commission of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental 
disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong.”  
Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2719. 
 80. The case presented two issues before the Court:  (1) whether an insanity 
statute stated solely in terms of moral incapacity violates due process; and 
(2) whether limiting defense evidence of mental illness solely to the issue of insanity, 
thus eliminating its applicability to the issue of the crime’s mens rea, violates due 
process.  Id. at 2716. 
 81. Id. at 2719; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 37, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 
2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966). 
 82. See Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716 (holding that due process is not violated by 
“Arizona’s use of an insanity test stated solely in terms of the capacity to tell whether 
an act charged as a crime was right or wrong”). 
 83. See id. at 2722 (“[I]t is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a 
baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of 
criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice.”).  The Court further noted 
that the cognitive incapacity prong of the M’Naghten rule is a sub-part of the moral 
incapacity prong and, therefore, an insanity standard composed solely of the latter 
prong also encompasses the former prong.  See id. at 2722-23 (stating that the moral 
incapacity standard does not necessarily require an analysis of the defendant’s 
cognitive capacity to understand the nature and quality of his actions, but cognitive 
incapacity is itself sufficient to demonstrate moral incapacity). 
 84. Id. at 2716. 
 85. With respect to Clark’s second due-process argument—limiting the 
admissibility of evidence on the accused’s mental state—the Court held that 
Arizona’s law comports with the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, 
reasoning that Arizona is free to define its insanity defense standard, and establish a 
presumption on sanity, “by placing the burden of persuasion on defendants who 
claim incapacity as an excuse from customary criminal responsibility,” so long as 
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within the state’s prerogative.86  Significantly, the Court did not 
address the Eighth Amendment implications of restricting the 
insanity defense, nor whether a state is free to abolish the defense 
altogether.87  Consequently, the issue of whether abolition of the 
affirmative insanity defense violates the Eighth Amendment of the 
federal Constitution remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. 
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment provides:  “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”88  This provision is applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.89 
A. The Historic and Contemporary Meaning of the Eighth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to 
prohibit not only punishments that are inherently barbaric,90 but also 
punishments that are excessive in relation to the crime committed.91  
Two considerations determine whether a punishment is excessive, 
and the violation of either may render a punishment 
unconstitutional.92  “First, the punishment must not involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”93  A punishment 
comports with this criterion if it contributes to acceptable penal 
                                                          
“Arizona has sensible reasons to assign the risks as it has done by channeling the 
evidence.”  Id. at 2732, 2736. 
 86. Id. at 2732. 
 87. See id. at 2721 n.20 (“[The Court has never held] that the Constitution 
mandates an insanity defense, nor . . . that the Constitution does not so require.  This 
case does not call upon us to decide the matter.”). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-
29 (1972) (Marshal, J., concurring) (canvassing the history and development of the 
Eighth Amendment, including its English predecessor doctrine, the similar 
principles espoused in the state constitutions of revolutionary America from which 
the Amendment derived its language, and its development and application in 
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence). 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40; Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). 
 90. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 91. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (explaining that the 
Eighth Amendment bars excessive punishments because “it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense”). 
 92. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) 
(“When a form of punishment in the abstract . . . rather than in the particular . . . is 
under consideration, the inquiry into ‘excessiveness’ has two aspects.”).  This 
Comment’s thesis comports with this principle, as its focus is not on a specific form 
of punishment for a specific defendant, but instead this Comment considers 
punishment generally, for an entire class of offenders, for any and all crimes. 
 93. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
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goals94 such as deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, or 
incapacitation.95  Second, the punishment must be proportional.96  
Proportionality requires that all punishments be tailored to the 
severity of the crime itself97 and, in the capital-punishment context, to 
the offender’s personal culpability.98  In other words, punishment is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate if its severity is not relatively 
equivalent to the seriousness of the offense,99 as would be the death 
                                                          
 94. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (“Among unnecessary and wanton 
inflictions of pain are those [punishments] that are totally without penological 
justification.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 
(explaining that punishment “totally without penological justification . . . results in 
the gratuitous infliction of suffering” and is therefore violative of the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription against excessive punishments).  
 95. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (explaining that the principle 
justifications for criminal punishment are “incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or 
rehabilitation”); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 779 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting the traditional goals of punishment as “deterrence, 
incapacitation, just deserts, [and] rehabilitation”); see also 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law 
§ 1997 (2006) (discussing the traditional retributive, deterrent, rehabilitative, and 
preventive goals of punishment and explaining that the United States Constitution 
does not require a particular theory as the justification for punishment, but rather 
legislatures are free to justify criminal sentences on any one theory or combination 
thereof). 
 96. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (explaining that sanctions “grossly out of 
proportion” to the severity of the offense are unconstitutionally excessive); see also 
Weems, 217 U.S. at 372-73 (adopting proportionality as a constitutional standard 
under the Eighth Amendment).  But see 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2197 (2006) 
(suggesting that the principle of gross disproportion, which rejects the idea that 
there must be a strict proportion between crime and punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment, implies that proportionality is not a constitutional guarantee).  See 
generally Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-90 (1983) (canvassing the history and 
development of proportionality principles in English and American common law). 
 97. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91 (holding that all criminal sentences must be 
proportional to the offense, and creating a three-part proportionality analysis, which 
considers (1) the gravity of the offense and the severity of punishment, (2) sentences 
of other criminals within the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences for the same 
offense in other jurisdictions); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) 
(recognizing that non-death-penalty criminal sentences may be unconstitutionally 
disproportionate); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (“The 
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and 
sentence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.”). 
 98. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (“For purposes of imposing 
the death penalty . . . punishment must be tailored to . . . personal responsibility and 
moral guilt.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (stating that 
considerations of the “character” and “propensities” of the individual offender are 
necessary for the imposition of a “just and appropriate” punishment and that in 
capital cases such considerations are a constitutional requirement); see also California 
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that 
Court precedent reflects the belief that a nexus is required between the defendant’s 
moral blame and the imposition of capital punishment). 
 99. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284, 296, 303 (explaining the “deeply rooted” Anglo-
American principle that punishment be proportioned to the offense and holding 
that a life sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate for the offense of passing 
a “no account” check for $100). 
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sentence for a petty theft.100  And, in capital cases, punishment is also 
disproportionate if its severity is not comparable to the 
blameworthiness of the offender,101 as would be the case of a death 
sentence for an offender with a diminished culpability on account of 
mental deficiency.102  Thus, in certain contexts, the individual 
characteristics and personal culpability of the offender are critical in 
determining whether a punishment comports with the Eighth 
Amendment.  The Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence, which 
accounts for individual culpability, is not expressly limited to the 
death-penalty context.103  In practice, however, considerations of 
individual culpability, under an Eighth Amendment excessiveness 
analysis, have largely been limited to capital cases.104 
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments 
applies, at a minimum, to those forms of punishment that had been 
considered cruel and unusual at the time of the Bill of Rights’ 
adoption.105  In addition to draconian punishments condemned by 
                                                          
 100. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(stating that capital punishment for petty crimes is unconstitutionally 
disproportional). 
 101. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (stating in capital cases courts must consider the 
personal culpability of the individual defendant in sentencing because “we insist on 
‘individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death 
sentence’” (quoting Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))); see also Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (holding that death is a disproportionate 
punishment for rapists because such offenders lack the “moral depravity” necessary 
to justify capital punishment). 
 102. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the execution 
of juveniles is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because juveniles 
possess a diminished culpability on account of their underdeveloped mental state); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of capital punishment for mentally retarded 
offenders because they possess a diminished culpability on account of their mental 
deficiencies). 
 103. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 289 (noting that the Court has never drawn a distinction 
between imprisonment and execution when applying Eighth Amendment 
proportionality principles); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2197 (2006) (explaining that the 
prohibition against disproportional punishments is not limited to capital 
punishment, as the ban applies to all penalties, but that challenges based on the 
disproportionality of non-death-penalty sentences are rarely successful). 
 104. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of 
capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular 
sentences have been exceedingly rare.”); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 
393-94 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (surveying the importance of individual 
culpability in constitutional capital sentencing jurisprudence). 
 105. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).  Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court has itself recognized that punishing the insane was not acceptable at common 
law.  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1986) (citing William Blackstone’s 
discussions of the common law’s exculpatory disposition towards the actions of 
“lunatics,” and observing that “[i]t was well settled at common law that . . . 
‘lunatics[]’ were not subject to punishment for criminal acts committed under [that 
incapacity]”). 
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the common law in 1789,106 the Eighth Amendment forbids 
punishments that violate contemporary values of human dignity.107  
That is, punishments that modern society deems sufficiently excessive 
or inhumane as to offend our sense of decency are also 
unconstitutional. 
To apply this framework and determine which modern-day 
punishments are sufficiently excessive as to be cruel and unusual, 
courts look to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”108  These evolving standards are 
determined by an examination of state policy and legislation,109 
which, according to the Court, represents the “clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values . . . .”110  This 
objective analysis of a national consensus is then supplemented by the 
Court’s independent judgment of the punishment’s 
constitutionality.111  Thus, Eighth Amendment violations are 
determined in one of two ways:  first, whether society considered the 
challenged punishment cruel and unusual at the time the Eighth 
Amendment was drafted; or second, whether the challenged 
punishment violates contemporary standards of decency. 
                                                          
 106. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(noting that punishments considered cruel and unusual at the time of the Eighth 
Amendment’s framing included “‘burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the 
wheel’, quartering, the rack and thumbscrew, and in some circumstances even 
solitary confinement”) (citations omitted). 
 107. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (explaining that the Court considers modern societal 
values when determining the constitutionality of punishments because the Eighth 
Amendment protects against violations of “fundamental human dignity,” as well 
against “barbarous” punishments). 
 108. See id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality 
opinion)); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . .  The Amendment must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”). 
 109. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“Proportionality review under 
those evolving standards should be informed by . . . ‘the legislation enacted by the 
country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331)); see also Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment judgments . . . should be informed 
by . . . the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence—history and precedent, 
legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions 
are to be consulted.”). 
 110. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331. 
 111. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (“[I]n cases involving a consensus, our own 
judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the 
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 
597)); see also 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2197 (2006) (explaining that the Court’s 
determination into the excessiveness of a punishment includes an independent 
analysis into the constitutional propriety of agreeing or disagreeing with the national 
consensus’ judgment). 
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B. Robinson and Powell:  Contrasting Interpretations of the Eighth 
Amendment’s Applicability to Non-Death-Penalty Cases 
In Robinson v. California,112 decided in 1962, the Supreme Court 
held that a statute prescribing imprisonment for narcotic addiction, 
solely based on the person’s status as an addict, is cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.113  The law 
violated the Eighth Amendment not because the punishment itself 
(ninety days imprisonment) was cruel and unusual, but because the 
so-called criminal act, an illness, was not deserving of punishment.114  
“Even one day in prison,” the Court noted, “would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”115  
Thus, Robinson held that a law punishing a blameless individual is 
unconstitutionally excessive.  Although the Robinson Court deemed 
the defendant blameless because his illness was not a criminal act, the 
rationale implies that other individuals lacking culpability on account 
of personal characteristics, such as a severe mental defect, are 
similarly protected from criminal punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Robinson signaled a potential change in the Court’s approach 
towards interpreting the Eighth Amendment.116  It appeared that the 
Court viewed the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting punishment not 
only for status offenses, but also for morally blameless offenders.117  
However, this approach never materialized into a lasting doctrine, as 
the Court, just six years after Robinson, decided Powell v. Texas,118 
                                                          
 112. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 113. Id. at 667. 
 114. See id. at 666-67 (analogizing a narcotic addiction, “an illness which may be 
contracted innocently or involuntarily,” to other mental or physical diseases, and 
concluding that the mere status of illness is insufficient to justify criminal 
punishment). 
 115. Id. at 667. 
 116. See Joshua Dressler, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the Supreme 
Court:  How a Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1507, 1509-10 (1999) (discussing the historical importance of Robinson); 
David Robinson, Jr., Powell v. Texas:  The Case of the Intoxicated Shoeshine Man Some 
Reflections a Generation Later by a Participant, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401, 435-36 (1999) 
(speculating that Robinson could have been interpreted as establishing a 
constitutional requirement for self-control before punishment may be imposed). 
 117. Dressler, supra note 116, at 1510.  According to Justice Douglas: 
I do not see how under our system being an addict can be punished as a 
crime.  If addicts can be punished for their addiction, then the insane can 
also be punished for their insanity.  Each has a disease and each must be 
treated as a sick person . . . . [An addict may] be confined for treatment or 
for the protection of society.  Cruel and unusual punishment results not 
from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a crime. 
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 674-76 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 118. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
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wherein it foreclosed the potential for Robinson as a new basis for 
Eighth Amendment interpretation in non-death-penalty cases.119 
In Powell, the Court held that the prosecution of chronic 
alcoholics, under a statute criminalizing public drunkenness, did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments.120  Drawing analogies to the insanity defense,121 
the Court rejected the proposition that the Eighth Amendment 
categorically prohibits criminal punishment for being in a condition 
that the person is powerless to change.122  Thus, the Court seemed to 
back away from Robinson’s implication that the Eighth Amendment is 
violated by punishing acts, in the non-capital context, that are 
involuntary due to a condition the offender is powerless to change.123 
After Robinson and Powell, the Court’s position appears to be that 
the Eighth Amendment does not require an offender to commit a 
                                                          
 119. See Jeffrey Rowe, Comment, Revisiting Robinson:  The Eighth Amendment as 
Constitutional Support for Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, 
GENDER, & CLASS 95, 98 (2005) (explaining Powell’s effect on post-Robinson Eighth 
Amendment interpretation). 
 120. Powell, 392 U.S. at 517. 
 121. According to the Court: 
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into 
defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.  Yet, that task 
would seem to follow inexorably from an extension of Robinson to this case.  
If a person in the “condition” of being a chronic alcoholic cannot be 
criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being drunk in public, it 
would seem to follow that a person who contends that, in terms of one test, 
“his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect,” would 
state an issue of constitutional dimension with regard to his criminal 
responsibility had he been tried under some different and perhaps lesser 
standard, e.g., the right-wrong test of M’Naghten’s Case. 
Id. at 536 (citation omitted). 
 122. Id. at 532-33.  Here, it is important to note the distinction between punishing 
the “diseased” alcoholic, as dealt with in Powell, and criminal punishment for the 
insane offender.  The theory that the alcoholic is controlled by a disease does not 
enjoy much legal support, as alcoholism is commonly viewed as voluntarily brought 
about by the alcoholic’s free choice to begin drinking.  See Jodie English, The Light 
Between Twilight and Dusk:  Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 21 (1988) (explaining the differences between the disease concept 
of alcoholism and legal insanity in terms of the Powell decision’s relevance for the 
constitutional bounds of the insanity defense).  This is distinguishable from mental 
disorders that satisfy legal insanity tests.  Such diseases have never been recognized as 
conditions that one may voluntarily chose or forgo.  Id.  Accordingly, alcoholism 
does not involve an individual who is powerless to control his behavior, which is a 
central concern in legal insanity cases.  Thus, Powell is arguably distinguishable, on its 
facts, from cases involving the diseased insane offender. 
 123. See Robinson, supra note 116, at 437 (arguing that Powell foreclosed the 
possibility of interpreting Robinson as establishing the rule that self-control was a 
constitutional requirement for the imposition of punishment).  But see Heathcote W. 
Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to “Abolish” the Insanity Defense in S.1:  Squeezing a 
Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 704 (1976) (arguing that dictum of five justices in 
Powell (Justice White’s concurrence and the four dissenters) suggests that a majority 
on the Powell Court believed that the punishment of those who acted under 
compulsion may violate the Eighth Amendment). 
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voluntary act before courts may impose punishment,124 and that the 
Eighth Amendment, except in death-penalty cases,125 is not 
concerned with the moral culpability of the individual offender.  
There are compelling reasons, however, for the Court to abandon 
this restrictive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.126  With 
respect to the narrow context of mentally diseased offenders, the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis should return to considerations 
of individual culpability similar to the approach adopted in Robinson 
and in the Court’s contemporary death-penalty jurisprudence. 
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT DEATH-PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is 
characterized by a general unwillingness to address personal 
culpability issues,127 except in the capital-punishment context.128  
Accordingly, this Comment looks to the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
death-penalty jurisprudence for guidance on the issue of the Eighth 
Amendment implications of abolishing the insanity defense.  
Specifically, it analyzes the recent cases of Atkins v. Virginia,129 
concerning capital punishment for the mentally retarded, and Roper 
v. Simmons,130 concerning the juvenile death penalty.  These cases are 
particularly relevant to insanity doctrine because both involve the 
                                                          
 124. Rowe, supra note 119, at 98. 
 125. See discussion infra Part IV (describing and criticizing the Court’s reluctance 
to extend its Eighth Amendment death-penalty rulings to non-death-penalty 
contexts). 
 126. See discussion infra Part IV (addressing the similarities between the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment death-penalty cases and cases involving mentally diseased 
offenders, and arguing that these similarities require consistent application of the 
Eighth Amendment to both contexts). 
 127. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court's Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence accounts for the personal responsibility of the individual 
offender only in capital cases).  But see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 
(1962) (holding that the punishment of a drug addict solely for his status as an 
addict violates the Punishments Clause because such “offenders” are morally 
blameless and therefore such punishment is unconstitutionally disproportional).  
Although the Court’s non-death-penalty Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has since 
moved away from the type of personal-culpability considerations employed in 
Robinson, this decision illustrates the feasibility of a return to such proportionality 
analyses.  Moreover, the Court has never overruled Robinson. 
 128. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2197 (2006) (explaining that proportionality 
challenges to criminal sentences under the Eighth Amendment are typically 
successful only in the death-penalty context); see also Daniel J. Nusbaum, Note, The 
Craziest Reform of Them All:  A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of 
“Abolishing” the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1569 (2002) (arguing that 
an Eighth Amendment challenge to the abolition of the insanity defense likely would 
fail because the Supreme Court has only been receptive to such claims when capital 
punishment is involved). 
 129. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 130. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Eighth Amendment implications of punishing mentally deficient 
offenders. 
A. Atkins v. Virginia:  The Court Extends Eighth Amendment Protections 
to the Mentally Retarded 
In Atkins v. Virginia,131 the Court held that the imposition of the 
death penalty on the mentally retarded is a cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.132  The Court 
began its Eighth Amendment analysis by examining the capital 
punishment policies of the states through the evolving-standards-of-
decency lens.133  The Court based its analysis on state policies enacted 
since 1989, the year when the Court ruled that there was not a 
national consensus against capital punishment for the mentally 
retarded.134  Since 1989, seventeen states had enacted legislation 
prohibiting capital punishment for the mentally retarded, bringing 
the total number of jurisdictions prohibiting such punishment to 
thirty-one.135  The Court found this evidence to constitute a national 
consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders.136 
The Court then determined whether there were independent 
reasons, underlying the national consensus, that justified a 
prohibition against executing the mentally retarded.  It found such 
justification in the fact that executing the mentally retarded did not 
further the principle goals of capital punishment; namely, retribution 
and deterrence.137  The Court found that due to disabilities in the 
areas of reason, judgment, and impulse control,138 a mentally 
                                                          
 131. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 132. Id. at 321. 
 133. See id. at 313 (“[W]e shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have 
addressed the suitability of imposing the death penalty on the mentally 
retarded . . . .”). 
 134. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (holding that the federal 
prohibition against capital punishment for the mentally retarded, combined with 
Maryland’s similar prohibition and the fourteen states that rejected the death 
penalty completely, did not provide sufficient evidence of a national consensus 
against capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders). 
 135. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 (noting that thirty states and the federal 
government proscribe capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders). 
 136. Id. at 316. 
 137. See id. at 319 (“Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally 
retarded person ‘measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it is “nothing 
more than purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” and hence an 
unconstitutional punishment.’” (quoting Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 
(1982))). 
 138. See id. at 318 (finding that although mentally retarded persons often know 
right from wrong, studies show that their mental impairments result in “diminished 
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from 
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control 
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others”). 
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retarded individual does not “act with the level of moral culpability 
that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”139  The 
Court then concluded that the mentally retarded, as a class, possess a 
diminished culpability that requires a correspondingly diminished 
degree of punishment.140  Under this principle, the Court reasoned 
that the death penalty, reserved exclusively for the most depraved 
murderers, is a disproportionately severe form of retribution for the 
mentally retarded.141  This is because retribution—defined as society’s 
interest in imposing suffering upon an offender commensurate with 
the suffering caused by the offense142—requires that the severity of 
punishment correspond to the culpability of the offender.143  The 
execution of mentally retarded offenders, who as a class possess a 
diminished culpability, is necessarily disproportionate to the 
offender’s blameworthiness, and therefore fails to serve retributive 
goals. 
With respect to deterrence—the interest in preventing future 
crimes through the example of punishment144—the Court found that 
the mental disabilities of mentally retarded persons “make it less 
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of 
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based 
upon that information.”145  Hence, it is unlikely that the death penalty 
will have any deterrent effect on the prospective mentally retarded 
offender.  Further, removing the threat of execution for the mentally 
retarded will not affect capital punishment’s deterrent effect on 
offenders who are not mentally retarded, as such people will still face 
the death penalty.146  The Court concluded, therefore, that the 
execution of the mentally retarded failed to advance either of the 
penal interests that justify capital punishment, a judgment echoed by 
the national consensus.147 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 306. 
 140. Id. at 319. 
 141. Id. 
 142. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 1.5(a)(3). 
 143. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 144. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 1.5(a)(4). 
 145. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 321.  The Court supplemented this independent judgment against the 
execution of the mentally retarded with the additional justification that the mental 
disabilities of mentally retarded persons can “jeopardize the reliability and fairness” 
of their trial.  Id. at 306-07, 320-21 (reasoning that mentally retarded persons, in the 
aggregate, face a special risk of wrongful conviction and execution on account of the 
heightened possibility that they will make false confessions, their lesser ability to give 
meaningful assistance to counsel, their lesser ability to testify on their own behalf, the 
fact that they are often poor witnesses, and the heightened possibility that their 
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Because the Court found that states had created a national 
consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders, and 
because there were independent reasons underlying this consensus, 
the Court held that the death penalty is an unconstitutionally 
excessive punishment for mentally retarded persons.148  Thus, the 
Court extended Eighth Amendment protections to mentally retarded 
criminals, setting forth the categorical rule against executing the 
mentally retarded. 
B. Roper v. Simmons:  The Court Extends Eighth Amendment Protections 
to Juveniles 
Three years later, the Atkins precedent set the stage for the Court 
to reconsider the constitutionality of capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders.149  In Roper v. Simmons,150 the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids executing offenders who were under the age of 
eighteen when they committed their offense.151 
The Court began by reviewing objective indicia of a national 
consensus on juvenile capital punishment, as expressed by state 
policy.152  The evidence paralleled that which the Atkins Court 
deemed sufficient for a national consensus.  Thirty states prohibited 
the juvenile death penalty,153 and of the twenty states without a formal 
prohibition on the practice, executions of juvenile offenders were 
“infrequent.”154  Based on this evidence, the Court found that there 
was a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty.155 
                                                          
courtroom demeanor may convey a false lack of remorse).  Based on these reasons, 
the Court rendered a categorical rule against executing the mentally retarded. 
 148. Id. at 321 (“[T]he Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s 
power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender”) (quoting Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))). 
 149. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), overruled by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2001) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not prohibit capital punishment for juvenile offenders over 15 but 
under 18); see also State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) 
(reversing a seventeen-year-old’s death sentence because a national consensus 
against the juvenile death penalty had developed since Stanford was decided). 
 150. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 151. Id. at 578. 
 152. See id. at 564 (“The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of 
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question.”). 
 153. This figure comprises the twelve states that forbid capital punishment 
altogether and eighteen states that maintained it for adults, but expressly forbid it for 
juvenile offenders by either provision or judicial interpretation.  Id. 
 154. See id. at 565 (noting that in the past ten years, only Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Virginia have executed juvenile offenders); see also id. (explaining that in December, 
2003, the Kentucky Governor commuted the death sentence of Kevin Stanford—the 
very defendant whose death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in Stanford v. 
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The Court then applied its independent judgment to determine 
whether, consistent with the national consensus, the Eighth 
Amendment forbids executing juveniles.  Following the logic of 
Atkins, the Court examined the mental deficiencies inherent in all 
juveniles and concluded that such deficiencies inhibit the 
advancement of capital punishment’s penal goals.156  The Court 
found three key differences between juveniles and adults, which 
lessens the moral culpability of juvenile offenders.  First, there is a 
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility 
among youths under the age of eighteen.157  Second, juveniles are 
more “vulnerable or susceptible” to negative influences and 
pressures.158  Finally, juveniles have an underdeveloped sense of 
character and personality.159  As in Atkins, the Roper Court concluded 
that these mental deficiencies diminish the culpability of juveniles as 
a class.160 
Following the principles set forth in Atkins, the Court found that 
the diminished culpability of the juvenile offender renders capital 
punishment a less effective mechanism for advancing retribution 
interests because the required correlation between the severity of 
punishment and the blameworthiness of the offender is not 
satisfied.161  Similarly, the Court reasoned that the mental deficiencies 
                                                          
Kentucky—to a sentence of life imprisonment because, in the Governor’s words, “We 
ought not be executing people who, legally, were children”). 
 155. See id. at 567 (finding further evidence for a national 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 
1994, wherein Congress determined that the death penalty should not extend to 
juveniles). 
 156. See id. at 569-73 (analyzing the underdeveloped mental capacity of juveniles 
and concluding that the immaturity, vulnerability, and underdeveloped personality 
concomitant with youth detracts from the deterrent and retributive justifications for 
executing juveniles). 
 157. See id. at 569 (finding that these qualities result in ill-considered decisions 
and conduct in youths, that juveniles are disproportionately represented in all 
categories of reckless behavior, and that based on these immaturities most states 
prohibit juveniles from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental 
consent). 
 158. See id. (citing scientific sources indicating that youth is a period when people 
are most susceptible to influence and psychological damage, as evidenced by the 
“prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with 
control, over their own environment,” and that juveniles “lack the freedom that 
adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting”). 
 159. See id. at 570 (citing scientific findings that the personality traits of a juvenile 
are transitory). 
 160. See id. (“The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible 
behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult.’” (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1987))). 
 161. See id. at 571 (“[T]he case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with 
an adult.  Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed 
on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished . . . by reason of youth 
and immaturity.”). 
LEBLANC.OFFTOPRINTER 6/2/2007  3:54:36 PM 
1306 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:5 
of minors lessen the deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty.162  
Thus, the Court concluded that the execution of minors fails to 
advance the goals of the death penalty.163 
Based on the national consensus against the juvenile death penalty 
and the independent judgment underlying this consensus, largely 
determined by considering the individual culpability of juvenile 
offenders, the Court concluded that society views juvenile offenders 
as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal” and 
declared the execution of minors an unconstitutional punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.164  Thus, the Court extended Eighth 
Amendment protection to juvenile criminals and set forth the 
categorical rule against the juvenile death penalty. 
IV. UNDER THE EVOLVING-STANDARDS-OF-DECENCY ANALYSIS, DEATH 
IS NOT DIFFERENT 
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to decide Eighth 
Amendment cases outside the death-penalty context.165  
Consequently, a ruling granting Eighth Amendment protection to 
the insanity defense will require the Court to narrowly modify this 
dismissive approach to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  However, 
compelling reason exists for such a doctrinal shift, at least with 
respect to the narrow area of criminal punishment for insane 
offenders. 
All criminal cases involve the potential for some form of state-
imposed punishment.  When determining whether a form of 
punishment itself is sufficiently barbaric and therefore 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the focus is properly on the 
type of punishment, without regard to the individual characteristics 
of the punished.166  However, when determining whether a 
                                                          
 162. See id. at 571-72 (noting that the same qualities that render juveniles less 
culpable, “suggest[s] . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence” and 
“‘[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit 
analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be 
virtually not existent’” (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837)). 
 163. See id. at 572 (concluding that neither deterrence nor retribution justify the 
execution of minors). 
 164. Id. at 567-68 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)). 
 165. See supra note 127-128 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
unwillingness to extend Eighth Amendment protections outside of the death penalty 
context and noting the rarity of successful Eighth Amendment challenges in non-
capital cases). 
 166. For example, forms of punishments inherently cruel and unusual include 
burning at the stake, crucifixion, quartering, and thumbscrews.  Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).  Such punishments 
violate the Eighth Amendment solely because of their barbaric form.  Id.  In 
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punishment is unconstitutionally excessive under the evolving-
standards-of-decency analysis, the analysis should not focus 
exclusively on the form or severity of the punishment.  Rather, the 
individual characteristics of the offender must be considered.167  This 
is because the Eighth Amendment’s conditions for avoiding excessive 
punishments, ensuring proportionality and furthering penal goals, 
often require that the punishment be tailored to the offense and the 
blameworthiness of the offender.168 
The Court has rightly adopted this approach in capital cases.169  
However, this analysis should not be strictly limited based on the 
form of ultimate punishment, such that the Eighth Amendment is 
applied differently to otherwise similar legal and factual contexts.  Of 
course capital punishment, “unique in its severity and 
irrevocability,”170 is distinct from all other forms of punishment.171  
The mere fact that the ultimate sentence may differ in otherwise 
analogous cases, however, fails to provide a principled basis for 
avoiding consistent application of constitutional principles to similar 
legal and factual contexts.172  Rather, uniform and consistent 
                                                          
determining the constitutionality of such draconian forms of punishments, 
therefore, the individual characteristics of the punished are irrelevant.  Id. at 676. 
 167. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B (explaining the Eighth Amendment analysis 
employed in Atkins and Roper, which accounts for the individual characteristics of the 
offender and lessens the offender’s personal culpability based on mental deficiency). 
 168. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive punishments, which requires, inter alia, 
that punishments correlate to the severity of the offense and the moral blame of the 
offender); discussion infra Part V.B.1 (illustrating how incarcerating mentally 
deficient insane offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
excessive punishments because such punishment fails to advance acceptable penal 
goals); discussion infra Part V.B.2 (illustrating how the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against disproportional punishments is violated by punishing insane 
offenders because such punishment fails to correspond to such offenders’ individual 
culpability). 
 169. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (stating that the Court 
must consider personal culpability in capital sentencing because “we insist on 
‘individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death 
sentence’” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))). 
 170. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
 171. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“[D]eath differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in 
kind.  It is unique in its total irrevocability.  It is unique in its rejection of 
rehabilitation . . . .  And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is 
embodied in our concept of humanity.”); see also Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the 
Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1599 n.1 (2001) (discussing 
the origins of the principle that death is a categorically different form of 
punishment).  But see id. at 1619-22 (arguing that the claim that death is categorically 
different from other forms of punishment is not philosophically sound). 
 172. The Court endorsed this principle in Solem v. Helm, stating: 
There is no basis for the State’s assertion that the general principle of 
proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences.  The 
constitutional language itself suggests no exception for imprisonment.  We 
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excessiveness principles should govern similar cases involving the 
imposition of any punishment,173 irrespective of the punishment’s 
severity or form.174 
When citizens seek the protection of the Eighth Amendment, 
justice requires that that protection be equally available and effective 
for all similarly situated citizens facing punishment at the hands of 
the State.175  Foreclosing constitutional protections based solely on 
the potential sentence is not supported by other areas of 
constitutional criminal law.  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky illustrates 
this point by analogizing the Court’s anomalous death-is-different 
jurisprudence to other areas of constitutional criminal law, such as 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, 
and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, all of which apply 
                                                          
have recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes “parallel limitations” 
on bail, fines, and other punishments, and the text is explicit that bail and 
fines may not be excessive.  It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were both subject 
to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of 
imprisonment were not. 
463 U.S. 277, 288-89 (1983) (citation and footnote omitted).  The Court 
subsequently stepped back from this principle, overruling Solem’s holding that 
proportionality analysis is required in all criminal cases.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 965 (1991).  The reasoning in Solem, however, was sound, in its textual 
reading of the Eighth Amendment and its historical analysis, both of which 
supported the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment does not draw distinctions 
between punishments based on degree.  463 U.S. at 288-90.  The Court should, 
therefore, return to the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment it espoused in 
Solem, which recognizes the necessity of consistent Eighth Amendment application. 
 173. See Daniel Suleiman, Note, The Capital Punishment Exception:  A Case for 
Constitutionalizing the Substantive Criminal Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 458 (2004) 
(criticizing the Court’s “death is different” justification for applying different Eighth 
Amendment standards to otherwise similar cases, and arguing that such distinctions 
run counter to the underlying rationale, “a concern for justice,” for regulating 
criminal punishment). 
 174. Importantly, capital punishment is not necessarily a worse sanction than 
imprisonment.  Although common sense instructs that life is preferable to death, this 
is not a categorical rule.  There are situations when the conditions of life, particularly 
a life of incarceration, may lead an individual to prefer death.  Consider death-row 
prisoner John Martini’s statement: 
I just don’t want to live . . . .  Even if I win the appeals, they will put me in the 
[prison] population.  That’s the same thing.  It’s no life, and if they put me 
in protective custody, again, who wants to live 23 hours in the cell?  It just 
isn’t life. 
George James, The Machinery of Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1996, at NJ1.  This 
preference of death over a life of imprisonment offers further evidence that capital 
cases are not necessarily different from other felony cases solely because the 
punishment is thought to be a more severe penalty. 
 175. See Suleiman, supra note 173, at 452 (arguing for abandonment of the 
Supreme Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence and an extension of the 
requirements of blame and proportionality to non-capital cases because injustice, as 
traditionally understood and loathed by our constitutional framework, results from 
inconsistent application of the Eighth Amendment). 
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equally to capital and non-capital cases.176  It would be unreasonable, 
and arguably unconstitutional, to apply different constitutional 
standards in these important areas of criminal law, and it is similarly 
unreasonable to do so in the Eighth Amendment context. 
The combination of the abolition of the insanity defense and the 
Court’s reluctance to afford Eighth Amendment guarantees to 
similarly situated prisoners has resulted in an injustice against 
mentally diseased offenders.  The Court has a constitutional duty to 
correct this injustice,177 and can accomplish this by uniformly 
applying the Eighth Amendment evolving-standards-of-decency 
analysis where cases are similar.  As mentally diseased insane 
offenders suffer from a deficient mental state178 similar to that of 
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders,179 they bear the 
concomitant diminished culpability.  Despite the fact that Atkins and 
Roper were capital cases, this similarity justifies the application of the 
Eighth Amendment analyses from Atkins and Roper.180  Accordingly, 
the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment death-penalty jurisprudence 
concerning mentally deficient offenders should be extended to the 
analogous area of criminal punishment for insane offenders, thereby 
redressing the current denial of constitutional protections to 
mentally diseased offenders recently granted to the similarly mentally 
deficient offenders in Atkins and Roper. 
                                                          
 176. Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003—Is  the Death Penalty 
on Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 201, 220 (2004). 
 177. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910) (asserting the 
judiciary’s duty to determine whether legislation conflicts with the Constitution, 
declaring the judiciary’s constitutional supremacy to legislatures in such cases, and 
explaining that this duty and status requires the Court to void unconstitutional 
legislation). 
 178. See infra notes 255-260 and 265-267 (discussing the mental deficiencies 
common to insane offenders, including distorted abilities to process information, 
communicate, reason, and exercise impulse control; a vulnerability to external and 
internal influences; and a clouded or absent sense of personal responsibility). 
 179. See discussion infra Parts V.B.1.a-b, V.B.2 (comparing the mental deficiencies 
of mentally retarded and juvenile offenders and the diminished culpability attached 
to such offenders, with the mental deficiencies of insane offenders). 
 180. It is important to note that there is not always a clear distinction between 
capital offenses and offenses committed by insane offenders.  There is overlap, in 
that insane offenders also commit capital crimes.  See, e.g., Woman Not Guilty, supra 
note 2 (reporting that Andrea Yates, found not guilty by reason of insanity by a Texas 
jury, drowned her five children); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)-(8) 
(Vernon 2006) (stating that it is a capital crime in the state of Texas to murder more 
than one person during the same offense or to murder a person under six years of 
age).  There is, therefore, a greater likelihood for insane offenders to face the death 
penalty in jurisdictions that have abolished the affirmative insanity defense.  This 
supports the argument that the reasoning from the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
death penalty jurisprudence should be extended to the issue of criminal punishment 
for insane offenders. 
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V. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
The Eighth Amendment’s protections are not static.181  From time 
to time, as contemporary attitudes towards punishment shift, the 
acceptability of particular punishments must be reevaluated.182  Thus, 
while historical practice may protect other areas of constitutional law 
simply because a punishment enjoyed a period of acceptability, such 
acceptability should not enshrine that punishment in perpetual 
constitutional protection.183  Despite our common-law heritage of 
immunizing the insane from punishment, the recent practice of 
abolishing the insanity defense has escaped Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny.  The progressive nature of the Eighth Amendment 
illustrates that this recent practice is not immune from constitutional 
reconsideration,184 and centuries of legal history illustrate that 
punishing the insane is categorically excessive, in a manner that the 
Eighth Amendment has traditionally prohibited.  Thus, it is time for 
the Supreme Court to address the Eighth Amendment implications 
of the abolition of the insanity defense, apply the evolving-standards-
of-decency analysis from recent analogous cases involving mentally 
deficient offenders, and hold that the punishment of the insane is a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Application of the Eighth Amendment’s evolving-standards-of-
decency analysis to the question of whether the Constitution requires 
an affirmative insanity defense consists of two steps.  The analysis 
begins with a review of state legislation and policy towards the 
defense.185  That is, whether a sufficient number of states provide an 
insanity defense, thereby constituting a national consensus.  Next, the 
                                                          
 181. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 328 (1972). 
 182. See id. (insisting that the Punishments Clause is subject to continuous 
reexamination in accordance with contemporary attitudes and beliefs); Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (characterizing the Eighth Amendment as 
“progressive,” and stating that its meaning and protections may expand as “public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice”); cf. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 
417, 427-28 (1885) (explaining that shifts in public opinion transformed the once 
acceptable punishments of whipping and stocks to “infamous” punishments under 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, thereby changing the constitutional 
protections that govern the procedures involving such punishments). 
 183. See, e.g., Samuel C. Kaplan, “Grab Bag of Principles” or Principled Grab Bag?:  The 
Constitutionalization of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463, 469-72 (1998) (analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of historical practice in shaping constitutional rights, 
and explaining how tradition is often a justification for constitutionalizing a 
particular practice). 
 184. Furman, 408 U.S. at 328 (reviewing precedent establishing the Court’s 
willingness to reevaluate punishments for excessiveness, even where such 
punishment is “familiar and widely accepted”). 
 185. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (reiterating that the first step 
in the Eighth Amendment analysis is a review of state legislation addressing the 
challenged punishment). 
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analysis requires an independent judgment supporting the necessity 
of an insanity defense.186  More precisely, the Court must examine 
whether there is justification, independent of the objective indicia of 
state policy, for guaranteeing an insanity defense. 
An analysis of state policy reveals that there is an overwhelming 
national consensus against punishing insane offenders.  This 
consensus is underscored by two independent justifications for 
proscribing the criminal punishment of insane offenders.  First, such 
punishment fails to measurably advance acceptable penological 
interests, resulting in an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.”187  Second, such punishment is a disproportionate penalty on 
account of the inculpability inherent to all insane offenders as a 
class.188  Both conclusions render punishment unconstitutionally 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment.189  Thus, the two prongs of 
the Eighth Amendment’s evolving-standards-of-decency analysis are 
satisfied and the criminal punishment of insane offenders constitutes 
an unconstitutionally excessive punishment.  Accordingly, the 
affirmative insanity defense, the legal safeguard against this 
constitutional violation, merits constitutional protection. 
                                                          
 186. See id. at 313 (“[I]n cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is 
‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment 
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
597 (1977))).  Contra Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (arguing against 
the desirability and constitutionality of the Court exercising its own independent 
judgment in an Eighth Amendment analysis because “‘evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society[]’ . . . [have never been] a shorthand 
reference to the preferences of a majority of this Court . . . .  [T]o say and mean that, 
is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.”) (citation 
omitted).  This opinion, however, was overruled by Roper in 2005.  Accordingly, the 
Eighth Amendment analysis articulated in Roper, which employed the Court’s 
“independent judgment,” after identifying a national consensus, is the controlling 
precedent.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 187. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (stating that punishments 
“totally without penological justification” constitute unconstitutionally excessive 
“unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment as prohibiting sanctions “so totally without penological justification that 
it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering”). 
 188. See discussion supra Part IV (arguing that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
death penalty jurisprudence, which accounts for personal culpability in determining 
the constitutionality of the challenged punishment, should be extended to the 
insane-offender context); cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 589 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the proportionality analysis for death penalty cases must consider 
personal responsibility and moral blame); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 
(1982) (stating that in capital cases the courts must consider individual culpability of 
the defendant in sentencing because “we insist on ‘individualized consideration as a 
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence’” (quoting Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))). 
 189. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (asserting that the Eighth 
Amendment’s excessiveness proscription is violated by a punishment that is either 
disproportionate or fails to advance acceptable penal goals). 
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A. A Review of the States 
A basic review of state legislation reveals that a national consensus 
does exist against criminal punishment for insane offenders.  In all, 
forty-six states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia 
employ some form of an affirmative insanity defense for criminal 
defendants,190 signifying these jurisdictions’ view that criminal 
                                                          
 190. Eighteen states and the federal government employ some version of the two-
pronged M’Naghten rule.  See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (1975); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101.5 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 775.027 (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 611.026 (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.086 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 194.010 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW  § 40.15 
(McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-01(1) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 315 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.12.010 (West 2007); Stevens v. State, 806 So. 2d 1031, 1050-51 (Miss. 2001) 
(stating that in Mississippi the M’Naghten test is used to determine legal insanity); 
State v. Harms, 643 N.W.2d 359, 378-79 (Neb. 2002) (noting that the two-pronged 
M’Naghten rule is the test for legal insanity in Nebraska); State v. Thompson, 402 
S.E.2d 386, 390 (N.C. 1991) (stating that North Carolina uses the two-pronged 
M’Naghten rule); Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533, 540-41 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) 
(noting that Oklahoma uses the two-part M’Naghten rule to determine criminal 
insanity).  One state, Alaska, uses only the M’Naghten rule’s cognitive incapacity 
prong.  See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2004) (“In a prosecution for a crime, it is an 
affirmative defense that when the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the 
defendant was unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the 
nature and quality of that conduct.”).  Ten states have adopted only the moral 
incapacity prong of the M’Naghten rule.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (West 2001); 
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 401 (1995); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (West 2003); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (2004); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN., tit. 17-A, § 39 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) 
(LexisNexis 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-
2(20) (2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2006).  Three states use a two-
prong M’Naghten rule supplemented with the irresistible-impulse test.  See MICH. 
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 768.21a (LexisNexis 2004); State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658, 660-61 
(N.M. 1977) (discussing the history of New Mexico’s experience with its two-pronged 
M’Naghten rule and reaffirming New Mexico’s use of the M’Naghten rule 
supplemented with an irresistible-impulse test); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 
S.E.2d 439, 446-47 (Va. 1999) (noting that Virginia recognizes both the M’Naghten 
rule and the irresistible-impulse doctrine as tests for determining legal insanity).  
Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Model Penal Code 
insanity test, which looks to whether the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate 
the wrongful nature of the act due to mental disease or defect.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
312 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3 
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-400 (LexisNexis 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 504.020 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-109 (LexisNexis 2001); ORE. 
REV. STAT. § 161.295 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13, § 4801 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 971.15 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304 (2005); Malede v. United States, 
767 A.2d 267, 269 (D.C. 2001) (articulating the insanity test used in the District of 
Columbia, which is based on the American Legal Institute’s Model Penal Code); 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 729 N.E.2d 252, 255 (Mass. 2000) (articulating 
Massachusetts’ insanity test, which is based on the American Legal Institute’s Model 
Penal Code); State v. Martinez, 651 A.2d 1189, 1193 (R.I. 1994) (articulating Rhode 
Island’s insanity test, which is based on the American Legal Institute’s Model Penal 
Code); State v. Lockhart, 542 S.E.2d 443, 451 (W. Va. 2000) (identifying the Model 
Penal Code test for an insanity defense as the test in West Virginia); MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  One state, New Hampshire, uses a 
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responsibility should not attach to the acts of insane persons.  Only a 
substantial minority of states—Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas—
do not subscribe to the position that an insane offender, who 
otherwise possesses the requisite mens rea, should not be criminally 
liable for his actions. 
Applying the reasoning of Atkins191 and Roper,192 it is evident that a 
strong national consensus exists against holding an insane actor 
criminally responsible.  In both Atkins and Roper the Court 
determined that a national consensus existed based on the policies of 
thirty states forbidding the punishment in question.193  When Atkins 
and Roper were decided, twenty states allowed the sentencing judge or 
jury to impose the form of punishment that these decisions 
subsequently deemed unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, the Court 
determined that this forty-percent minority failed to negate the 
national consensus formed by the policies of the remaining sixty 
percent of states.  By this standard, a national consensus to protect 
the insanity defense is overwhelming.  If thirty states prohibiting a 
form of punishment constitutes a national consensus for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, then forty-six states should certainly form such 
a consensus.  Accordingly, the objective indicia of state policy reveal 
that an overwhelming national consensus exists against criminal 
punishment for insane offenders. 
B. Independent Justifications for Proscribing the Punishment of Insane 
Offenders 
The next step in the Eighth Amendment analysis requires an 
independent determination, consistent with and supplementing the 
national consensus, justifying a constitutional requirement of the 
insanity defense.194  There are two such justifications:  first, the 
primary penological interests justifying criminal punishment are 
poorly served, if at all, by punishing the insane; and second, criminal 
                                                          
product insanity test.  See State v. Plante, 594 A.2d 1279, 1283 (N.H. 1991) (citing 
State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871)) (explaining that New Hampshire’s insanity rule 
requires an acquittal if the defendant's crime was the product of a mental disease). 
 191. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16 (reasoning that thirty states plus the federal 
government forbidding capital punishment for the mentally retarded constitutes a 
national consensus against such punishment). 
 192. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68 (reasoning that thirty states banning the juvenile 
death penalty constitutes a national consensus against such punishment). 
 193. See supra notes 135-136 and 152-164 and accompanying text (discussing the 
evolving-standards-of-decency analyses employed Atkins and Roper). 
 194. See supra notes 138-148 and 152-164 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Eighth Amendment analysis employed in Atkins and Roper, which involved the 
Court’s independent judgment of the constitutionality of the challenged 
punishment). 
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punishment is a categorically disproportionate penalty for the 
inculpable insane offender.  Consequently, such punishment is 
unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment.195 
1. Punishing otherwise insane offenders fails to measurably advance 
acceptable penological interests 
If states deny the affirmative defense of insanity, criminal 
convictions for the insane will result.196  If the subsequent criminal 
sentence fails to advance acceptable goals of punishment197 then such 
punishment is “nothing more than the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering,” and therefore unconstitutionally 
excessive.198  An analysis of the applicability of the traditional theories 
of punishment—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation199—to the context of the insane offender reveals that 
these goals are not advanced by punishing such offenders.  
Consequently, such punishment is unconstitutional. 
a. Retribution 
Under the theory of retribution, punishment is justified because 
society has an interest in imposing merited suffering upon offenders 
proportional to the harm that their crime caused society.200  However, 
                                                          
 195. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the modern interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment, including the proscription of excessive punishments, which are 
those that fail to measurably contribute to acceptable penal interests or are 
disproportionate). 
 196. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (illustrating how adoption of a mens rea model 
will result in the criminal conviction of otherwise insane offenders). 
 197. It is unclear the extent to which penal goals must be advanced for a 
punishment to satisfy this excessiveness requirement.  Recent Court decisions speak 
of a “measurable” furtherance of penal goals.  E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
319 (2002); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).  However, Roper, the 
Court’s most recent decision applying an Eighth Amendment excessiveness analysis, 
used a particularly stringent standard for measurable advancement, finding that the 
goal of deterrence was not furthered by the punishment in question because the 
evidence was “unclear.”  543 U.S. at 571-72.  Moreover, the Roper Court refused to 
defer to the determinations of legislatures regarding the efficacy of sentencing 
policy.  Id.  This suggests that the Court is now applying heightened standard to the 
determination of whether penal goals are advanced, requiring “clear” evidence, 
which satisfies the Court’s independent judgment, rather than deferring to the 
findings of state legislatures. 
 198. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 199. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that these four theories 
of punishment have been recognized by the Supreme Court, and other legal 
authorities, as the traditional justifications for state-imposed sanctions). 
 200. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.1(c)(6); see also IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW:  AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE 
SCIENCE OF RIGHT 194 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887), available at 
http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/Texts/Kant0142/PhilosophyOfLaw/0139_Bk.p
df (“The Right of administering Punishment is the Right of the Sovereign as the 
Supreme Power to inflict pain upon a Subject on account of a Crime committed by 
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there are limits and conditions on punishment under retributive 
theory.201  In addition to having committed the wrongful act, the 
perpetrator must be deserving of the degree of punishment.202  
Specifically, retribution requires that the punishment be 
proportional to the personal culpability of the offender.203  If the 
offender possesses diminished culpability, then the punishment must 
be correspondingly lessened.204  Similarly, if the offender is entirely 
inculpable then any punishment is undeserved and the goals of 
retribution are not served.205 
One who lacks free will, irrespective of his otherwise wrongful acts, 
is an inculpable individual206 for whom punishment fails to serve the 
                                                          
him.”); Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance:  The Resilience of Retribution as an 
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2000) 
(defining retribution as a concept directed at imposing merited harm upon an 
offender for his wrongful conduct, and not for advancing social goals, such as 
reforming wrongdoers). 
 201. See Wales, supra note 123, at 700 (arguing that retributive justifications for 
punishment substantially restrict the government’s authority to punish its citizens 
because retribution requires moral blame for the imposition of punishment). 
 202. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes:  Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 427 (1997) (arguing that punishments not tailored to the 
offender’s personal culpability are unjustifiable under the theory of retribution). 
 203. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of retribution 
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.”); LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 1.5(a)(6) n.43 
(explaining that retribution requires that “the severity of the sanctions visited on the 
offender should be proportioned to the degree of his culpability” (quoting F. Allen, 
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 66 (1981))); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2001 
(2006) (explaining the principle that punishment must be proportionate to the 
crime, and stating that this proportionality analysis requires considerations of the 
particular circumstances of the offense and the “particular character of the 
defendant”). 
 204. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that mentally 
retarded offenders are categorically exempt from the harshest form of American 
punishment, the death penalty, because their diminished culpability requires a 
diminished degree of punishment). 
 205. The theory of retribution justifies punishment based on the moral culpability 
of the punished.  KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 107-08 (citing Michael S. 
Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in FERDINAND SCHOEMAN, RESPONSIBILITY, 
CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 179 (1987)).  If the offender lacks blameworthiness, then 
his actions do not merit punishment.  See English, supra note 122, at 24 (arguing that 
blameworthiness has been a condition precedent to criminal punishment in our 
common law heritage since the twelfth century); id. (explaining that moral 
culpability is a necessary condition for the imposition of punishment under 
retributive theory); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. at 283 (1985) (recognizing 
as a fundamental principle the fact that crime means condemnation and one cannot 
be condemned if their act was not culpable).  Any punishment inflicted upon the 
blameless is therefore excessive, as it bears no relation to culpability. 
 206. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 375 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., 
dissenting) (“[W]ithout the consent of the will, human actions cannot be considered 
as culpable; nor where there is no will to commit an offense, is there any just reason 
why a party should incur the penalties of law made for the punishment of crimes and 
offenses.” (quoting 1 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 2 (4th ed. 1865))). 
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goals of retribution.207  This is because retribution justifies 
punishment on the ground that the offender made the free choice to 
commit the wrongful act, a choice unaffected by factors external to 
his or her will.208  It is this free choice to commit, or forgo, the 
blameworthy act that renders the offender deserving of 
punishment.209  Conversely, the absence of free will precludes the 
attachment of blame to the actor’s behavior, and therefore negates 
the propriety of retributive punishment. 
The criminally insane offender is characterized by a complete 
absence of free will over his actions.210  By definition, the insane 
offender’s acts result from a mental disease, not a controllable 
conscious choice.211  Because the insane offender lacks a free will he is 
inculpable, and therefore his punishment does not further the penal 
goal of retribution.212 
The Court applied similar reasoning in Atkins and Roper.  In Atkins, 
the Court held that mentally retarded persons possess a diminished 
culpability on account of their mental deficiencies.213  Because of this 
diminished culpability, the Court found that capital punishment is 
                                                          
 207. See English, supra note 122, at 26 (arguing that an essential element of 
retributive theory is that people possess free will). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 
(1769), quoted in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(observing that lunatics are characterized by a “deficiency in will”).  Blackstone 
argues that this “deficient will” prevents the attachment of guilt because “the 
concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the act in 
question, [is] the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or 
culpable.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 20-21 
(1769), quoted in Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency:  Keeping Determinism Out of the 
Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 n.16 (2005); see also Wales, supra note 123, at 
703 (questioning the wisdom and constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defense 
because the insane offender lacks a “will to control the physical act of his physical 
body”).  The fact that the majority of insanity standards require the offender to labor 
under a mental disease or defect, which prevents the actor from understanding his 
conduct, illustrates that an insane offender by definition lacks the capacity for free 
choice.  Since free choice is a necessary element of a volitional act it follows that an 
insane offender does not exercise free will over his actions.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1605 (8th ed. 2004). 
 211. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring 
an insanity acquittal if it is found that the defendant’s conduct was the result of 
mental disease that caused the defendant to lack substantial capacity to either 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law).  
Under this insanity standard, the defendant’s actions will have been the result of a 
mental disease, which either clouded his cognition or inhibited his volitional control.  
In either event, the defendant’s conduct was not the result of free will. 
 212. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) (declaring that 
retribution is never served by punishing the “incompetent” insane offender, and 
warning that such a policy must be avoided because “a need for retribution can never 
be permitted in a civilized society to degenerate into a sadistic form of revenge”). 
 213. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
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categorically excessive for mentally retarded persons.214  The Court 
reasoned that diminished culpability must translate into lesser 
punishment, otherwise retribution, which requires a correlation 
between the punishment and the offender’s blameworthiness, is not 
served.  Analogously, the insane offender is characterized by a 
complete absence of moral culpability, on account of the absence of 
free will involved with the offense.215  Therefore, under the logic of 
Atkins, criminal punishment should not attach to the actions of an 
individual who is without personal culpability.216  To do so is 
inconsistent with the theory of retribution. 
Similarly, in Roper the Court held that retribution is not 
proportional, and hence excessive, if the government imposes the 
law’s most severe punishment—the death penalty—on an individual 
with a diminished personal culpability inherent to their youthful 
mental state and personality.217  This conclusion applies with equal 
force to insane offenders who, by reason of their mental disease, lack 
a free will and are thus not morally culpable for their actions.  
Accordingly, retribution is not served by punishing insane offenders, 
and retributive theory cannot justify such punishment. 
b. Deterrence 
The theory of deterrence justifies punishment as a means to 
prevent future crimes.218  By giving society an example of the 
consequences of wrongful actions, other would-be offenders are 
                                                          
 214. See id. at 321 (“[T]he Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the 
State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))). 
 215. See supra note 210 (discussing William Blackstone’s contention that the 
absence of free will in “lunatics” precludes the attachment of culpability to their 
otherwise criminal conduct); see also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 986 
(D.C. 1972) (emphasizing the lack of a free will as “the root of origin of the insanity 
defense”). 
 216. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21 (holding that executing the mentally retarded is 
unconstitutionally excessive and reasoning that the diminished culpability of such 
offenders, on account of their mental disability, requires a correspondingly lessened 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment).  But see id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Surely culpability, and deservedness of . . . retribution, depends not 
merely . . . upon the mental capacity of the criminal (above the level where he is able 
to distinguish right from wrong) but also upon the depravity of the crime . . . .”).  
Here, Justice Scalia argues that the depravity of the crime should factor into the 
propriety of retributive punishment, notwithstanding the mental capacity of the 
offender.  However, Scalia’s qualification that mental capacity below the ability to 
“distinguish right from wrong” should factor into the propriety of retributive 
punishment, supports the conclusion that punishing insane offenders, who by 
definition cannot “distinguish right from wrong,” does not further the interest of 
retribution. 
 217. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
 218. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 115-16. 
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deterred from similar conduct.219  This theory breaks down, however, 
when applied to the punishment of otherwise insane offenders.  
Consequently, deterrence is not served through such punishment. 
Deterrence is effective only if people view the lessons of the 
offender as applicable to them, which is likely if they can identify with 
the offender and the circumstances of the offense.220  A sane person is 
unlikely to identify with an insane offender or the offending 
situation, and thus is not susceptible to the deterrent effect of 
punishing the insane.221  Nor would an insane person learn any 
deterring lessons from the punishment of other insane offenders.222  
It is the same mental disease that causes an insane offender’s criminal 
conduct, which also makes that offender incapable of understanding 
or learning from the punishment of others.223 
This logic was incorporated in Atkins, where the Court found that 
“it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make 
[mentally retarded] defendants less morally culpable . . . that also 
make it less likely that they can process the information of the 
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their 
conduct based upon that information.”224  Similarly, in Roper the 
Court found the very characteristics rendering a juvenile less 
culpable, an underdeveloped mental state and personality, also 
render juveniles less susceptible to deterrence.225  Since criminal 
                                                          
 219. See LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.1(c)(4) (explaining that deterrence reinforces 
the law-abiding tendencies of the general public through the example of punishing 
those who have failed to abide by the rule of law). 
 220. See English, supra note 122, at 26 n.134 (citing A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 13 (1967)). 
 221. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(“Nothing can more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting insanity 
than the proposition, equally objectionable in its humanity and its logic, that the 
insane should be punished for criminal acts, in order to deter other insane persons 
from doing the same thing.” (quoting ISAAC RAY, TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 56 (5th ed. 1871))); LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.1(c)(4) 
(stating that the punishment of the insane fails to serve as a deterring example to 
ordinary offenders); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 166 (1985) (stating 
that the legally insane are “plainly beyond the deterrent influence of the law”). 
 222. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Those who are 
substantially unable to restrain their conduct are, by definition, undeterrable and . . . 
those who are unaware of or do not appreciate the nature and quality of their actions 
can hardly be expected rationally to weigh the consequences of their conduct.”); see 
LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.1(c)(4) (stating that insane people who think they are sane 
are unlikely to identify with another insane defendant). 
 223. See infra notes 255-261 and accompanying text (explaining that the mental 
diseases of insane offenders typically distort the capability to understand and process 
information, to reason logically, the ability to learn from experience, and the ability 
to understand the conduct of others). 
 224. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). 
 225. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005) (“‘[T]he likelihood that 
the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any 
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punishment for insane offenders is unlikely to prevent future crimes 
committed by either sane or insane persons, the criminal justice 
system is not likely to deter future crime by punishing insane persons 
for criminal offenses.  Hence, the theory of deterrence cannot serve 
as a justification for punishing the insane. 
c. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is the interest in preventing recidivism through 
assisting and facilitating the offender’s transition to a lawful 
lifestyle.226  This penological interest presumes the effectiveness of 
employing therapeutic measures inside prison.227  While the 
rehabilitation programs of America’s penal institutions may serve to 
reform the ordinary, mentally sound inmate, the unique challenges 
posed by the insane offender’s severe mental disorder require 
therapeutic measures beyond the capacities of ordinary prison 
facilities.228 
Prison rehabilitation programs, where they even exist, are often 
under-funded and given low priority, frequently resulting in 
ineffective treatments for inmates, a problem particularly acute for 
the severely mentally diseased prisoner.229  Moreover, the 
rehabilitation of an insane offender requires specialized psychiatric 
treatments, therapy that differs significantly from that appropriate for 
mentally sound inmates.230  Consequently, ordinary prison 
                                                          
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.’” 
(quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1987))). 
 226. See ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 175 (1986) 
(discussing the meaning and purpose of criminal rehabilitation); LAFAVE, supra note 
7, § 1.5(a)(3) (explaining rehabilitation as the process of reforming criminals, 
through therapeutic measures, so that they return to society cured of their criminal 
tendencies). 
 227. English, supra note 122, at 25. 
 228. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615, 626 n.61 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(stating that the rehabilitation of the legally insane is never served through criminal 
sentencing because the mentally ill will not be “miraculously cured and rehabilitated 
in a place [prison] we know to be traditionally incapable of producing such 
resurrections”). 
 229. See ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 226, at 149 (discussing the lack of therapeutic 
commitment programs for mentally ill criminal offenders in the criminal-justice and 
mental-health systems, and stating that “[w]ith few exceptions, mentally disordered 
offenders receive substandard treatment”); English, supra note 122, at 25 (stating 
that prisoners have no right to rehabilitative therapies and legislatures are often 
reluctant to fund such programs, and noting that there is “widespread doubt” as to 
whether such treatment could even be effective in the prison setting). 
 230. See English, supra note 122, at 25 (noting the common acceptance that 
rehabilitation of the insane is best achieved through treatment different from that 
appropriate for ordinary prisoners). 
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rehabilitation measures are likely inadequate to effectively treat, and 
therefore reform, the otherwise insane offender.231  Committing such 
offenders to psychiatric institutions, the typical destination for insane 
persons acquitted of criminal liability,232 more optimally serves the 
goals of rehabilitation.233 
Because prison is the likely destination of otherwise insane 
offenders who are not afforded an affirmative insanity defense,234 and 
                                                          
 231. Of course, some level of psychiatric treatment is available during traditional 
incarceration.  However, given the uniquely challenging psychiatric conditions of 
many mentally diseased offenders and the limited resources available for prison 
treatment, successful therapy is unlikely while incarcerated.  See Brief for the 
Treatment Advocacy Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15, 17, 
Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966) (discussing the particularly 
challenging treatment issues posed by mentally diseased patients).  In addition to a 
lack of resources, the conflicting goals of therapy and security also detract from 
successful prison therapies for insane offenders.  Psychiatric therapy requires 
increased degrees of responsibility for the patient’s own judgment and actions, and a 
corresponding reduction in institutional control.  LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 8.4(b).  
Prison, on the other hand, is concerned with security, which typically requires 
physical confinement to a cell and strict control over the inmate’s life.  See id. 
(arguing that the goals of security and therapy are often irreconcilable and “resolved 
by favoring security over therapy”). 
 232. See supra note 8 (explaining procedures after a finding of not guilty by reason 
of insanity, namely the commitment to a mental institution for psychiatric 
treatment). 
 233. See Freeman, 357 F.2d at 615 (opining that the rehabilitation of insane 
offenders is only achievable through commitment to specialized mental institutions).  
But see Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that, in order to 
satisfy the Eighth Amendment, prisons unable to adequately treat the mental 
illnesses of inmates must ensure that prisoners’ medical needs and emergencies are 
met by competent outside physicians and facilities).  The procedures set forth in 
Hoptowit potentially diminish the danger of insane offenders going untreated or 
poorly treated while incarcerated.  However, the potential for a transfer to a 
psychiatric institution does not eliminate this danger.  After all, it is the same under-
staffed and under-resourced prison facilities that are responsible for discovering the 
mental illness requiring a mental health transfer.  The same problems of prison 
health services, which render such facilities ineffective at treating the insane within 
prison, also make it less likely that such facilities have the resources or expertise to 
initially diagnose a prisoner as sufficiently diseased to require the receipt of services 
by an outside medical provider.  Moreover, referrals to outside facilities are not 
always guaranteed.  See 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 86 (2006) (explaining that prisoners’ rights 
to mental health services are limited, and determinations as to nature and extent of 
treatment are “within the prerogative of prison officials”).  In Hoptowit, for example, 
such referrals were only required if the outside facilities were reasonably accessible, 
and if the prison could not provide adequate services within its own walls.  682 F.2d 
at 1253.  Further, the prisoner’s right to mental health services is protected by the 
deferential “deliberate indifference” standard, which requires a showing of 
purposeful and deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials to the 
prisoner’s medial need, making the legal enforcement of this right particularly 
challenging.  60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal and Correctional § 203 (2006).  Hence, referrals to 
outside psychiatric facilities are a poor safeguard against the dangers of mentally 
diseased prisoners going untreated. 
 234. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (illustrating that criminal 
conviction for otherwise insane offenders is the likely result of abolishing the 
affirmative insanity defense). 
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because prison rehabilitative efforts are likely inadequate for the 
effective treatment and reformation of the insane, the theory of 
rehabilitation is ill-served by their punitive imprisonment.  
Accordingly, the penal interest of rehabilitation fails to justify the 
criminal punishment of insane offenders. 
d. Incapacitation 
The last interest justifying criminal punishment is society’s interest 
in incapacitating offenders to protect the rest of society from the 
danger they pose.235  Admittedly, locking up insane offenders 
temporarily serves the goal of incapacitation, as the offender is 
removed from the community for the duration of the sentence.236  
However, the underlying goal of incapacitation—protection for 
society237—is potentially undermined by such punishment.  This is 
because society is not guaranteed that the insane offender will receive 
psychiatric treatment while in prison, which deprives society of long-
term, sustainable protection from dangerous insane offenders.238  In 
fact, imprisoning insane offenders may directly endanger society, as 
the mental condition which resulted in the original criminal conduct 
could be worsened through a term of imprisonment.239  Accordingly, 
the imprisonment of otherwise insane offenders runs counter to the 
goals of incapacitation. 
A better approach for protecting society is to provide an affirmative 
insanity defense, thereby assuring that insane individuals acquitted of 
crimes will be committed to psychiatric institutions until their 
dangerous propensities subside.240  This guarantees that insane 
                                                          
 235. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976) (stating that 
incapacitation is concerned with removing dangerous members of society so as to 
prevent future crimes that they may otherwise have committed); see also Cotton, supra 
note 200, at 1316 (defining incapacitation). 
 236. See State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984) (arguing that 
incarcerating the insane serves the “goal[] of protect[ing] society”); cf. State v. Stacy, 
601 S.W.2d 696, 704 (Tenn. 1980) (Henry, J., dissenting) (“In a very real sense the 
confinement of the insane is the punishment of the innocent; the release of the 
insane is the punishment of society.”). 
 237. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2006) (explaining that while states are free 
to justify criminal punishment under the various theories of retribution, 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and prevention, the overriding interest is always the 
protection of society). 
 238. English, supra note 122, at 24. 
 239. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 626 n.61 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[I]f we 
send [insane offenders] to prison, they may come back to haunt society after their 
release, more mentally disturbed, more irresponsible, and more crime prone than 
ever before, because whatever the prison does to men it does not cure mental 
illness.”). 
 240. See English, supra, note 122, at 24 (explaining that most states require insanity 
acquittees to be “automatically, involuntarily, and indefinitely committed” to mental 
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offenders receive proper psychiatric and rehabilitative therapy and 
arguably assures that the level of treatment is superior to that offered 
in a penal institution.241  In comparison to psychiatric commitment, 
the protective purpose of incapacitation is poorly served by the 
punitive imprisonment of insane offenders.  Consequently, the penal 
interest in incapacitation is an inadequate justification for punishing 
insane offenders. 
Removing the insanity defense from the criminal law ensures that 
insane offenders will receive criminal punishment for their otherwise 
excusable misconduct.  Such punishment does not further the goals 
of retribution and deterrence, does not effectively advance the goal 
of rehabilitation, and runs counter to the underlying principle of 
incapacitation.  Accordingly, punishing the insane fails to measurably 
contribute to acceptable penological goals,242 and is therefore an 
unconstitutionally excessive “wanton infliction of pain.”243 
2. Criminal punishment is a categorically disproportionate penalty for the 
inculpable insane offender 
The Eighth Amendment requires proportionality in punishment.244  
Implicit in this requirement is that criminal sentencing be 
proportional to the offender’s personal culpability.245  If a 
                                                          
heath institutions); supra note 8 (discussing institutional commitment procedures of 
the states). 
 241. See discussion supra Part V.B.1.c (discussing the shortcomings of mental 
health services for insane offenders in a prison setting). 
 242. Proponents of abolishing the insanity defense may argue that criminal 
punishment has an important symbolic value, serving as an expression of societal 
norms against unwanted conduct.  See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LAW IN 
SOCIETY, in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 106-07 (explaining punishment’s 
function of maintaining social cohesion by expressing society’s common aversion to 
criminal behavior); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING, in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, 
supra note 8, at 105-06 (discussing the symbolic value of criminal punishment).  But 
symbolic expression of community values is not a traditional penological interest 
underlying criminal punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.  See, e.g., supra 
note 95 and accompanying text (discussing four justifications, recognized by the 
Supreme Court, for criminal punishment:  incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, 
and rehabilitations); see also LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.1(c) (discussing the traditional 
justifications of punishment, of which symbolism is not included).  Accordingly, 
while criminal punishment is arguably a valuable mechanism for expressing societal 
aversion to particular conduct, this interest does not justify punishment for Eighth 
Amendment purposes. 
 243. Gregg v. Georgia, 42 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (holding that death is a 
disproportional punishment for rapists because such offenders lack the “moral 
depravity” necessary to justify capital punishment); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2001 
(2006) (explaining that a proportionality analysis requires considerations of the 
particular circumstances of the offense and the “particular character of the 
defendant”); see also supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (explaining the 
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punishment is grossly disproportionate, then it may violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription against excessive punishments, despite 
that punishment’s furtherance of acceptable penal interests.246  The 
insane offender is categorically inculpable by virtue of the mental 
disease that inhibits or controls his faculties or actions.  Accordingly, 
the conviction of such individuals necessarily results in punishment 
incomparable to their moral blameworthiness.  Such punishment is, 
therefore, grossly disproportionate and unconstitutionally excessive 
under the Eighth Amendment. 
The criminally insane offender is characterized by a complete 
absence of free will over his actions.247  By definition, the insane 
offender’s criminal actions result from a mental disease, not a 
controllable conscious choice.248  Because free will is a necessary 
condition for the attachment of moral blame,249 the insane offender’s 
absence of will renders him categorically blameless.250  This absence 
of personal culpability renders any punishment disproportional, as 
the required fit between the severity of punishment and the extent of 
personal blame cannot be met.  That is, any punishment fails to 
correlate to the offender’s personal blame, which is altogether 
absent.  Accordingly, punishing otherwise insane offenders violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement. 
The Court applied similar reasoning in Atkins and Roper, cases 
involving the analogous context of mentally deficient offenders.  
Atkins found that mentally retarded offenders, by reason of their 
                                                          
Eighth Amendment’s requirement that punishment be proportional to the severity 
of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender). 
 246. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4 (stating that a death sentence is a disproportionate 
punishment for a rapist and is therefore an unconstitutionally excessive punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment, even though such punishment may serve legitimate 
goals of punishment). 
 247. See supra note 210 (explaining the absence of will created by the insane 
offender’s severe psychological deficiencies). 
 248. See, e.g., supra note 211 (explaining the Model Penal Code's insanity standard, 
which requires acquittal only if the defendant's conduct was caused by mental disease 
and not the result of free will). 
 249. See English, supra note 122, at 26 (arguing that free will is a condition 
precedent to punishment because it is the offender’s conscious choice to commit the 
wrongful act that creates blame and justifies punishment); Rowe, supra note 119, at 
110 (explaining that moral blame attaches only to the actions of those capable of 
conforming their conduct to societal norms of wrongful behavior). 
 250. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(characterizing insane offenders as “truly irresponsible” on account of their “lack 
[of] substantial capacity to control their actions”); English, supra note 122, at 26-27 
(explaining that the insanity defense evolved from the principle that individuals “so 
psychologically deficient that they could not be blamed justly for their misconduct” 
should not be punished). 
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“subaverage intellectual functioning,”251 have “diminished capacities 
to understand and process information, to communicate, . . . to learn 
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, 
and to understand the reactions of others.”252  Based on these mental 
impairments, the Court held that such offenders are less culpable 
than normal offenders and, thus, do not deserve capital 
punishment.253  The rationale is that a lessened culpability requires a 
lessened degree of punishment.  Such logic is applicable to the 
analogous situation of punishment for mentally deficient insane 
offenders. 
Similar to the mentally retarded, insane offenders,254 by reason of 
their mental disease, possess severely limited or distorted capabilities 
to understand and process information,255 to communicate 
effectively,256 to reason logically,257 to learn from experience,258 to 
                                                          
 251. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (referring to the American 
Association of Mental Retardation’s definition of mental retardation as “substantial 
limitations in present functioning . . . characterized by significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning”). 
 252. Id. at 318. 
 253. Id. 
 254. It is important to note that “insanity” is a legal term of art and not a 
condition recognized by the medical community.  Of course, there is a necessary 
overlap between medically recognized conditions and the diseases that form the basis 
of a defendant’s insanity defense.  For instance, schizophrenia is a condition 
recognized by the medical community and is also a disease prevalent in legally insane 
offenders.  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 297 (4th ed. 2000) (classifying schizophrenia as a medically 
recognized psychiatric disorder); Mayo Clinic Staff, Schizophrenia and Chronic Mental 
Illness, MAYOCLINIC.COM, Feb. 6, 2006,  http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/ 
schizophrenia/DS00196/DSECTION=1 (defining the mental illness of 
schizophrenia); see also Blaine Harden & Nina Bernstein, Legally Insane:  A Special 
Report; Voices in His Head Muted, A Killer Rejoins the World, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2000, at 
A1 (discussing the case of Dennis Sweeney, who in 1980 killed former Congressman 
Allard K. Lowenstein and was subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity 
based on his paranoid-schizophrenic condition). 
 255. See Brief for the Treatment Advocacy Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 231, at 11 (citing research showing patients who suffer from 
severe mental disease are unable to differentiate psychosis-induced delusions and 
hallucinations from reality); BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 72 (noting that mentally 
disordered offenders are often characterized by lacking the capability to process 
information received); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 254, at 299-300 (finding 
that schizophrenics experience disorganized thinking, often resulting in grossly 
disorganized behavior, and typically possess a deficit in processing perception and 
sensory stimuli); Mayo Clinic Staff, Schizophrenia and Chronic Mental Illness:  Signs and 
Symptoms, MAYOCLINIC.COM, Feb. 6, 2006,  http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/ 
schizophrenia/DS00196/DSECTION=2 (finding that a cognitive symptom of 
schizophrenia is difficulty understanding incoming information). 
 256. See BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 69 (citing English psychologist J. Cutting’s 
finding that a typical characteristic of schizophrenia is a reduced “capacity to 
experience and communicate emotion”); Mayo Clinic Staff, Schizophrenia and Chronic 
Mental Illness:  Signs and Symptoms, supra note 255 (noting that schizophrenia is 
characterized by poor social functioning, social isolation, and inappropriate displays 
of emotion). 
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understand the conduct of others,259 and to exercise impulse control 
or even the ability to act upon their own free will.260  In fact, the 
offender who satisfies a legal standard for insanity (not 
understanding the nature and quality of one’s actions, for example) 
may lack these abilities altogether.261  This severe mental deficiency, 
controlling volition or inhibiting cognition, negates these offenders’ 
free will, rendering this class categorically inculpable.262  Under the 
logic of Atkins, which links the degree of punishment to the degree of 
culpability, the absence of blame attached to the actions of otherwise 
insane offenders must result in an absence of punishment. 
The Roper Court reached similar conclusions based on the mental 
deficiencies of juvenile offenders.  In Roper, the Court found that 
                                                          
 257. See JOHNNY L. MATSON & VIRGINIA E. FEE, SOCIAL SKILLS DIFFICULTIES AMONG 
PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION 468-78 
(Johnny L. Matson & James A. Mulick eds., 2d ed. 1991) (discussing common 
characteristics of mentally diseased persons, including illogical behavior and thought 
processes); see also LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.2(a) (noting that offenders who satisfy 
the M’Naghten standard, the most common insanity defense in American 
jurisdictions, must suffer from a defect in reasoning as a result of their mental 
disease). 
 258. See BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 76 (finding that people with schizophrenia 
fail to properly “segmentalize” life’s experiences, resulting in a tendency to focus on 
information in parts and an inability to understand experiences as a whole).  
Moreover, studies suggest that schizophrenics have difficulty processing and 
comprehending information that is presented visually, a disadvantage that further 
complicates the process of learning.  Id. 
 259. See id. at 69 (citing studies which found that chronic schizophrenic patients 
possess a decreased ability to identify emotional themes, such as affection or 
reprimand, and a decreased ability to recognize emotions present in photographs of 
faces); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 254, at 302 (finding that schizophrenics are 
often characterized by substantially impaired interpersonal functioning and social 
isolation). 
 260. See BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 70 (stating that some mentally disordered 
people “lack a normal ability to control their behavior”); see also id. (discussing 
specific examples of mentally disordered persons exhibiting a complete lack of 
impulse control, such as a patient who lodged a pencil in his right eye who claimed 
that the Biblical passage Matthew 5:29 led him to such an act; a patient who castrated 
himself in response to the passage Matthew 19:12; and the case of a patient whose 
mental disorder led her to frequently attack her own daughter, to whom she was 
otherwise very affectionate).  Delusions, defined as false beliefs despite 
uncontroverted evidence to the contrary, are also prevalent in mentally disordered 
offenders.  Buchanan, supra note 30, at 75; Donna M. Praiss, Note and Comment, 
Constitutional Protection of Confessions Made by Mentally Retarded Defendants, 14 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 431, 445 n.109 (1989).  Delusions can direct or control one’s behavior, 
resulting in actions outside of one’s willful control.  See id. (describing the case of a 
delusional man who attacked his parents with a meat cleaver because he was 
convinced they were machines who had kidnapped him). 
 261. The behavior of the defendant who extracted all of her daughter’s teeth 
because she believed that the devil was inside of them exemplifies such substantial 
impairments of reason and the inability to learn from experience.  See supra note 68 
and accompanying text. 
 262. See discussion supra Part V.B.1.a (examining the relation between free will 
and culpability, and arguing that the absence of the former precludes the latter). 
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juvenile offenders, by reason of their underdeveloped minds, possess 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, are more susceptible to 
negative influences, and have an underdeveloped sense of character 
that leads to an inability to extricate themselves from criminal 
situations.263  The Court concluded that these deficiencies diminish 
the culpability of juvenile offenders, requiring a correlative 
diminishment in the degree of punishment that can be 
constitutionally imposed on minors.264 
The insane offender possesses similar mental deficiencies, but to a 
much greater degree.  As a result of severe mental disease, the insane 
offender possesses a clouded or absent sense of personal 
responsibility,265 is more vulnerable to negative internal or external 
pressures (such as the influence of others or their own delusions),266 
and has similarly transitory personality traits due to the fluctuating 
effects of their disease.267  Again, such severe disease precludes the 
exercise of free will and negates moral blame.  Based on analogous 
mental deficiencies and diminished culpability, it is reasonable to 
extend the legal conclusions of Roper to the insane-offender context 
and hold that the absence of culpability among the insane renders 
criminal punishment categorically disproportionate. 
Atkins and Roper involved legal considerations concerning the 
appropriate punishment for offenders who possess a diminished 
culpability.  Further, these precedents were decided in factual 
contexts involving mentally deficient offenders.  The question 
concerning the constitutionality of criminal punishment for insane 
                                                          
 263. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (citing Laurence Steinberg & 
Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:  Developmental Immaturity, 
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 
1014 (2003)). 
 264. See id. at 575, 578 (finding that capital punishment is disproportionate to the 
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders and consequently holding that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the law’s most severe punishment—the 
death penalty—on minors). 
 265. See BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 65 (explaining that a schizophrenic often 
sees his own actions as “automatic” and noting that a schizophrenic often observes 
his conduct from the perspective of a detached spectator).  Given that a 
schizophrenic may view his own behavior from the perspective of a spectator, it 
logically follows that a sense of personal responsibility for those actions is diminished 
or absent. 
 266. For example, symptoms of schizophrenia, a common mental disease 
associated with insanity acquittals, include the “oppressive awareness” of one’s own 
inability to effectively or healthily cope with or manage a given internal or external 
situation.  Id. at 64. 
 267. See id. at 64-65 (noting that a common symptom of schizophrenia is 
“depersonalization,” which has been defined, for medical purposes, as “a state in 
which the ‘individual feels completely changed from what he was previously’” and 
ceases to “recognize himself as a personality”). 
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offenders involves similar legal and factual considerations, and it is 
therefore reasonable to apply the principles of Atkins and Roper to 
this analogous issue.  Accordingly, just as the diminished culpability 
of the mentally retarded and juvenile offenders requires a diminished 
punishment, the absence of culpability of the insane offender 
requires an absence of punishment.268  Therefore, any criminal 
sentence for the insane offender represents a disproportionate 
punishment, which violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against excessive punishments. 
In sum, the evolving-standards-of-decency analysis reveals that there 
is an overwhelming national consensus against punishing insane 
offenders.  The propriety of this consensus is supported by the 
independent determination that such punishment fails to serve 
traditional penological goals.  Additionally, the independent 
justification that such punishment is disproportionate for the 
inculpable class of insane offenders also supports this consensus and 
renders such punishment unconstitutionally excessive.  These 
requirements satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s evolving-standards-of-
decency analysis.  Thus, the abolition of the insanity defense, and the 
concomitant punishment of insane offenders, violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, the mechanism to safeguard against this 
constitutional violation—the affirmative insanity defense—deserves 
constitutional protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The affirmative insanity defense enjoys a rich tradition in Anglo-
American jurisprudence and continues in an overwhelming majority 
of American states.  The modern-day practice is grounded in the well-
settled principle that those unable to understand or control their 
behavior are without moral blame, and are therefore undeserving of 
punishment.  To punish such offenders represents an unjustifiable 
infliction of suffering upon the guiltless, which is counter to our ideas 
of decency and justice.  It is the healthy functioning of these legal 
principles and societal norms that have protected the insanity 
defense for centuries. 
                                                          
 268. The Supreme Court has already recognized the general principle that mental 
disease can reduce the culpability of criminal offenders.  See California v. Brown, 479 
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[D]efendants who commit 
criminal acts that are attributable to . . . emotional and mental problems, may be less 
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”).  Hence, it is not unreasonable 
to extend this diminished-culpability rationale to allow for complete exculpation in 
cases where the diseased offender’s actions are entirely the result of disease, and not 
a function of free will. 
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The recent abolition of the insanity defense in Montana, Idaho, 
Utah, and Kansas exemplifies a dramatic departure from our 
common-law heritage and modern principles of humanity.  This 
abolition, and the ensuing criminal punishment of otherwise insane 
offenders, represents a continuing miscarriage of justice, which the 
Court must address.  The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against 
cruel and unusual punishments has always afforded our citizens a 
minimum level of protection against unjustified punishment at the 
hands of the State.  The imposition of State punishment upon the 
inculpable in Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas, screams out for the 
constitutional protection that the Court has historically provided 
through the Eighth Amendment.  It is time for the Supreme Court to 
address this wrong, and recent Court precedents offer a logical and 
workable basis for extending Eighth Amendment protection to the 
blameless class of insane offenders. 
The Court has addressed the relationship between individual 
culpability and excessive punishments in the analogous area of 
capital punishment for mentally deficient offenders.  In that context, 
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of 
juveniles and the mentally retarded due to those groups’ diminished 
personal culpability and the resulting failure of capital punishment to 
measurably advance acceptable penal interests.  The legal and factual 
similarities between this area of jurisprudence and the issue of 
punishment in general for insane offenders offers a logical basis for 
applying the same rules and reasoning to both contexts. 
Applying the Eighth Amendment principles set forth in Atkins and 
Roper to the insane-offender context, it is evident that punishing the 
insane violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive 
punishments.  There is an overwhelming national consensus against 
punishing the criminally insane, supported by the independent 
reasoning that such punishment poorly serves commonly accepted 
penal interests and is grossly disproportionate to the moral 
culpability of this class of offenders.  Accordingly, the Court should 
apply its recent Eighth Amendment death-penalty rules and 
reasoning to the criminally insane offender context and grant all 
mentally deficient defendants the constitutional protection of an 
insanity defense, thereby protecting society’s guiltless from unjust 
punishments. 
 
